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ABSTRACT
Debates about land use federalism—like those about federalism more
broadly—often focus on whether policies and priorities ought to be set at
the national or local level. But such categorical judgments about national
intervention are inadequate because they obscure the diversity of
mechanisms by which nationalization can and does occur. This Article
draws attention to the importance of this underappreciated legislative
design choice and develops a framework within which to evaluate it. This
Article observes that nationalization can take the form of rules that either
displace local decisionmaking or channel it, and that those rules can be
implemented either by fiat or by way of incentive. These are not equivalent
in terms of their effects on local democracy. Quite the contrary: the threat
to the values of local democracy that motivate land use federalism arises
primarily from decision-displacing fiat nationalizations—a tool that is
likely unnecessary for most categories of land use goals. On the other
hand, national action that channels land use decisionmaking or that
incentivizes outcomes can achieve its ends while avoiding pernicious
effects on local democracy. In fact, these forms of national action can even
enhance local democracy. By confronting the full range of nationalizing
options and accounting for their varied democratic impacts, this Article
offers a solution to the federalist–nationalist dilemma in land use law, and
may chart a path through the same thicket in other contexts.
INTRODUCTION
All politics may be local, but few areas of law and policy are
considered more quintessentially local than land use. A common refrain in
the scholarship and discourse surrounding land use is thus that it “has
always been an intensely local area of the law.”1 “No serious scholar,” it
has been asserted, “supports an expanded role for the national government
in traditional land use regulation.”2
1. Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local
Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 839 (1983); see, e.g., Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513
U.S. 30, 44 (1994) (“[R]egulation of land use [is] a function traditionally performed by local
governments.”); see also Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990) (“Land use control is the most important local regulatory
power.”); William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional Complexity,
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 98 (1999); Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Land Law Federalism, 61 EMORY L.J.
1397, 1399 & n.4 (2012) [hereinafter Ostrow, Land Law] (collecting sources).
2. Sara C. Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, Land Use Regulation, and
the States, 93 MINN. L. REV. 231, 262 (2008); see, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, Land Use Regulation: The
Weak Link in Environmental Protection, 82 WASH. L. REV. 651, 653 (2007) (“The United States
has . . . limited federal control largely to retained public lands, and enshrined the idea that land should
be controlled at the lowest level of government, if at all.”); Eric T. Freyfogle, The Particulars of
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These are plausible normative commitments. For one thing, property
owners tend to particularly value local control of land use issues3—whether
for emotional reasons,4 reasons of personal autonomy,5 or economic
reasons.6 For another, local control of land use is efficient and serves
broader societal interests. First, local actors know their communities and
their idiosyncratic needs best, or at least better than lawmakers in
Washington.7 Second, local government is most accountable and
responsive to the people whose interests are implicated by land use
decisions and who can participate in that decisionmaking process.8 And on
top of all of that, the weight of tradition tilts in favor of local control, given
that land use has been a local matter from “the early days of the Republic.”9
And yet, the federal government has carved out a meaningful and
diverse role for itself in land use decisionmaking.10 For example, the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)—which
Owning, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 574, 580 (1999) (“Direct federal regulation [of land use], for many citizens,
is simply taking things too far.”).
3. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 5–6 (2001) [hereinafter
FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS]; Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 617–18
(2002) (reviewing FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra); Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for
Small Governments: Local Governments and the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1645–52
(2006). Indeed, for these reasons, local land use decisionmaking “often feature[s] robust rates of local
participation and influence.” Heather K. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4,
24 (2010).
4. See Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763, 1789 (2002);
Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1874 (2004).
5. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 346, 452 (1990); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957
(1982).
6. See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 3, at 75.
7. See Bronin, supra note 2, at 262; Buzbee, supra note 1, at 92; Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 580;
Rose, supra note 1, at 887 (noting importance of “decisionmakers who know the issues directly”).
8. See, e.g., FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE
CONTROL 3 (1972) (noting that “local zoning so strongly emphasizes” “the values of citizen
participation and local control”); Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story
Behind the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 335 (2003); Ashira
Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 289, 294–97
(2011) [hereinafter Ostrow, Process Preemption]; Rose, supra note 1, at 883–87; Schragger, supra note
4, at 1871.
9. Bronin, supra note 2, at 236; see Buzbee, supra note 1, at 92, 98.
10. See Craig Anthony Arnold, The Structure of the Land Use Regulatory System in the United
States, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 441, 486–87 (2007) (making similar observation); Patricia E.
Salkin, The Quiet Revolution and Federalism: Into the Future, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 253, 255
(2012) (“The federal government . . . seemingly maintaining a low profile when it comes to usurping
local land use control, has probably had the greatest influence on [it] over the last forty years . . . .”).
But see, e.g., William A. Fischel, The Evolution of Zoning Since the 1980s: The Persistence of
Localism
4
(Sept.
1,
2010)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1686009 (noting that while “many formerly local activities such as road
building, public health, care for the poor, school finance, prosecution of corruption, and water quality
regulation (even drinking water regulation), have been largely pre-empted by the state and federal
government,” “[t]he most striking quality about zoning is that it is still local”).
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has been described as a “national land-use ordinance”11—prohibits
localities from imposing by land use regulation substantial burdens on
religious exercise that do not further compelling governmental interests and
that are not the least restrictive means of doing so.12 The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA) requires localities to follow
decisionmaking procedures similar to those applicable to federal
administrative agencies whenever they wish to deny a telecommunications
company’s application to build or modify a cell phone tower in the
community.13 The Fair Housing Act (FHA) subjects localities to liability if
their actions have the disparate impact of “mak[ing] unavailable” housing
to persons on the basis of race or other protected criteria.14 The list goes on:
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 grants the federal government the authority
to preempt land use regulations with respect to siting certain energy
transmission lines;15 federal transportation law requires localities to
regionally engage in certain long-term land use planning efforts as a
condition of receiving federal highway funds;16 and a variety of
environmental laws, including the Clean Water Act and the Coastal Zones
Management Act, provide or deny funds in an effort to incentivize certain
land uses and deter others.17
Some of these statutes have proven quite controversial precisely
because they risk intruding upon local control. For example, though it was
enacted with little dissent, RLUIPA remains the subject of much debate
within the academy—both on its merits and because of the belief that it is
an unwarranted interference with an area set aside for local
decisionmaking.18 RLUIPA has become even more controversial with the
public at large in the wake of increased demands for religious
accommodations.19 Even the TCA, which has met with a fair degree of
11. Schragger, supra note 4, at 1839.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2012).
13. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B) (2012).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012).
15. 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b) (2012).
16. 23 U.S.C. § 134(i) (2012).
17. See, e.g., Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (2012); Coastal Barriers
Resources Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (2012); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1281(g) (2012).
18. See, e.g., Zachary Bray, RLUIPA and the Limits of Religious Institutionalism, 2016 UTAH L.
REV. 41, 42, 61; Marci A. Hamilton, The Constitutional Limitations on Congress’s Power over Local
Land Use: Why the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act Is Unconstitutional, 2 ALB.
GOV’T L. REV. 366, 369 (2009) (calling RLUIPA “the most reckless federal intervention in local land
use law and community decision-making in history”); Lawrence G. Sager, Panel One Commentary, 57
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 9, 14 (2000); Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, The Genesis of RLUIPA
and Federalism: Evaluating the Creation of a Federal Statutory Right and its Impact on Local
Government, 40 URB. LAW. 195, 215, 255–56 (2008); Schragger, supra note 4, at 1844–48.
19. See, e.g., Arthur H. Gunther III, Community View: RLUIPA Ripe for Challenge, J. NEWS
(May 28, 2014, 2:23 PM), http://www.lohud.com/story/opinion/contributors/2014/05/22/rluiparockland-land-use-environment/9458553/.
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success, has faced the charge that it “conscript[s]” localities into federal
service.20
This debate about federal land use regulation is a classic federalism
debate, and the arguments against these land use statutes are the same
arguments raised against national solutions more generally. For example,
federalism scholars often emphasize how local variation nurtures local
democracy and “promotes choice, competition, participation,
experimentation, and the diffusion of power.”21 At the same time, the
arguments in favor of these land use statutes are the arguments often made
by proponents of national solutions in general. Some policy questions
demand national uniformity,22 they contend, and some questions of rights
must not be subordinated to reductive claims of “states’ rights.”23
But particularly with respect to land use federalism, these sorts of
arguments paint with too broad a brush.24 As this Article shows, there is
great diversity in federal land use law. This diversity exists not only in
20. T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808, 824 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(quoting FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
21. Gerken, supra note 3, at 6; see, e.g., Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the
Court’s “Unsteady Path”: A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447,
1467–69 (1995) (contending that federalism promotes diversity and enhances preference-satisfaction);
Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 389–404 (1997) (explaining that
federalism promotes participation, accountability, innovation, tailoring, diversity, and liberty); Peter H.
Schuck, Introduction: Some Reflections on the Federalism Debate, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y. REV. 1, 4
(1996) (“Federalism now serves both as an instrument of the modern administrative state and as a rather
flexible institutional accommodation to the extraordinary diversity of American society and to the
challenges that this diversity poses for national unity.”).
22. Reed Abelson, Proposals Clash on States’ Role in Health Plans, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/14/health/policy/14insure.html (quoting Democratic Representative
John Garamendi arguing during the drafting of the Affordable Care Act that “[t]he role of the federal
government is to put in place a national marketplace” and Democratic Representative James Clyburn
saying that “[y]ou cannot allow them to have a states-rights approach [to health care]”).
23. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND
TRAGIC COMPROMISE 53, 115–23 (2008); DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 44–57
(1995); Gerken, supra note 3, at 44, 46.
24. These arguments are also often deployed opportunistically. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen,
Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV. 953, 998 (2016) (noting that arguments
about appropriate levels of policymaking “largely depend on the partisan composition of each
government rather than something about state versus federal authority as such”); Frank B. Cross,
Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1307 (1999) (“[F]ederalism is
consistently . . . employed only derivatively, as a tool to achieve some other ideological end . . . .”);
Garrett Epps, Opinion, The Opportunist’s Friend (and Foe): States’ Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20,
2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/20/opinion/the-opportunist-s-friend-and-foe-states-rights.html
(“[W]hen it comes to states’ rights, we are all hypocrites.”); Michelle Goldberg, If at First You Don’t
Secede, SALON (Nov. 16, 2004, 7:55 PM), http://www.salon.com/2004/11/17/states_2/ (arguing that, in
the event abortion were to be prohibited nationwide, “pro-choice states [would] rely[] on the doctrine of
federalism, or states’ rights, to defend themselves,” and observing that such an “opportunistic and even
hypocritical” embrace of federalism by the left is “nothing new”); Albert R. Hunt, States’ Rights,
Depending on the Issue, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/29/
us/politics/states-rights-depending-on-the-issue.html (noting pledges by Republican presidential
candidates to prohibit at the national level the legalization of marijuana at the state level).
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terms of the aspects of local land use decisionmaking that these statutes
nationalize but also in terms of the ways in which they do so. Indeed, how
Congress nationalizes is as consequential as what it chooses to
nationalize.25 More important, most of the mechanisms available to
Congress can actually achieve a balance that satisfies national priorities
amidst a rich local democracy. Even better, many can make local
democracy even more vibrant and even more responsive.26
To demonstrate as much, this Article evaluates the implications of
three key legislative design choices. The first is a threshold question: what
is the goal of the nationalization? Some efforts aim to minimize or
eliminate cross-jurisdictional coordination problems that stymie national
policy goals and inhibit national markets. Others aim to protect rights that
the national government believes are underprotected at the local level.27
The second choice has to do with the mechanism by which that goal will be
achieved: what type of restriction on local decisionmaking will be
imposed? Congress may impose decision-channeling constraints that
require localities to take certain deliberative steps before making certain
decisions, or it may impose decision-displacing rules that limit the set of
decisions localities may make in the first place.28 Finally, the third choice
asks: how will those restrictions be implemented? Whether a
nationalization displaces or channels local decisionmaking, Congress may
either impose those requirements by fiat or elicit compliance by way of
condition or incentive.29
My analysis of the varied effects that these legislative design choices
have on local democracy reveals that the threat to local democracy comes
chiefly from a particular type of nationalization: decision-displacing rules
imposed by fiat. This particular mechanism fails to employ local
knowledge and, even worse, introduces structural decisionmaking biases
that make local government less responsive and less participatory.
By contrast, decision-channeling statutes can achieve their ends while
avoiding pernicious effects on local democracy because they leave ultimate
25. Cf. Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 2022 (2014)
(advocating a focus on “the details of the federal statutory design” and their varied federalism
implications). This attention to means is likewise in the spirit of some of the scholarly discussion about
the federalism implications of commandeering as opposed to preemption. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel,
Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1634–35
(2006).
26. In this way, just as Heather Gerken has offered her own account of “why nationalists should
stop worrying and learn to love federalism,” Gerken, supra note 3, at 44; see also Heather K. Gerken,
Federalism as the New Nationalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1889, 1892 (2014) (explaining how federalism can
serve nationalist ends), this Article suggests the converse in the context of land use law: with the right
means, federalists might stop worrying and learn to love nationalism.
27. See infra Part II.A.
28. See infra Part II.B.
29. See infra Part II.C.

3 POLLACK - LAND USE - 707-758 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

Land Use Federalism’s False Choice

4/10/2017 1:24 PM

713

decisionmaking in the hands of local institutions. Even if those institutions
are not optimally responsive, a decision-channeling nationalization at least
avoids making them less so, and where those institutions are responsive,
decision-channeling approaches make more robust use of them than
decision-displacing approaches do. But more importantly, decisionchanneling nationalizations can alter how local institutions behave in ways
that improve their functioning by decreasing decisionmaking bias,
harnessing local knowledge, and creating sites of bargaining and
participation. Nationalization by incentive can offer similar responsiveness
gains over nationalization by fiat because it catalyzes local conversations
about priorities.
For these reasons, Congress ought to give these mechanisms
presumptive priority over those that displace local decisionmaking by fiat,
even if doing so means restricting the locality’s room to maneuver to a
slightly greater degree. For example, Congress ought to prefer a national
law that instructs localities to take certain deliberative steps before
approving blue houses over a national law that demands that localities not
approve any blue houses. It also ought to prefer a law that instructs
localities to take certain deliberative steps before approving both blue
houses and purple houses over a no-blue-house command.
Of course, this rule of presumptive priority is just that: a presumption.
There may well be circumstances in which a nationally imposed decisiondisplacing rule, responsiveness costs and all, is the only thing that will do.
But in light of the success of alternative mechanisms discussed in this
Article, those circumstances will arise less frequently than one might think.
Rather than include all or even most national priorities, they are likely to be
limited to situations in which local decisionmaking is characterized by
deeply entrenched and conscious biases against the exercise of
constitutional rights.30 Make no mistake: this is a small set of the bases for
nationalization. Moreover, even within this narrow band, a range of
channeling mechanisms might still get the job done.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the traditional
democratic participation and responsiveness arguments in favor of local
control of land use. It then develops a lens for evaluating how national
constraints on local land use decisionmaking impact those values. Part II
sets out in more detail the three central legislative design choices that
Congress faces and illustrates them with example statutes. Part III evaluates
the implications of those choices under the framework developed in Part I.
It identifies the source of the threat to local democracy, and it demonstrates
the superiority of channeling rules and of incentives. Finally, Part IV
grapples with the conditions under which at least some local democratic
30. See infra Part IV.
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costs might be necessary for the achievement of certain national goals, and
argues that those conditions are rare. But even if one were to quarrel over
the precise metes and bounds of that set of circumstances, understanding
the promise of decision-channeling and incentive mechanisms offers a way
to bridge the federalist–nationalist divide in land use, and perhaps beyond.
Federalists have less to fear from efforts at nationalization that leave space
for local control, and nationalists can safely embrace local control when it
can be channeled in the direction of national priorities.
I. VALUING LOCAL DEMOCRACY
In this Part, I begin by explaining why national land use law’s effects
on local democracy warrant particular focus. I then argue that failures of
local democracy are best understood in this context as structural biases in
decisionmaking processes and as institutional barriers that separate
decision makers from sources of community knowledge.
A. Why Value Local Democracy
One traditional argument in favor of local democratic control of land
use decisionmaking is what William Fischel called the “homevoter
hypothesis”: a land use regime with meaningful and low-cost opportunities
for local participation is of unique importance to property owners because,
having made substantial investments in their property, “the best hope of
maintaining or improving [their] investment[s] is ‘voice,’ involvement in
the political process.”31 Even beyond this investment-backed explanation,
there remains an “emotional—and politically powerful—attachment to
local decisionmaking on specific issues” like land use,32 perhaps rooted in
part in the perception that property ownership is “closely connected to core
areas of personal autonomy.”33 Whatever the precise mix of explanations,
property owners strongly “prefer to find their land locally planned and
regulated by persons they know and can more easily influence rather than

31. FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 3, at 75; see, e.g., Fennell, supra note 3, at
626 (noting that, because exit is costly, “people are also motivated to act politically, using ‘voice’ to
influence the actions taken by the municipality”); Serkin, supra note 3, at 1648 (explaining that the fact
that a person’s home “usually represents her most significant asset” combined with her “strong personal
attachment to her property, creates a powerful incentive for homeowners to . . . carefully polic[e] local
government land use decisions”).
32. Frug, supra note 4, at 1789.
33. Briffault, supra note 5, at 452; see Radin, supra note 5, at 957–58 (discussing property’s role
in “personhood” and autonomy).
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by persons more remote by measures of distance, knowledge, and
susceptibility to influence.”34
Property owners are not wrong to place great importance on their
ability to effectively exercise voice when it comes to land use
policymaking. Whereas dissatisfied members of most institutions can
exercise both voice and exit to improve their lot,35 exit is fraught in a
number of ways in the context of property ownership. Though Charles
Tiebout famously conceived of local government as an institution from
which people may exit in response to unsatisfactory government policies,36
the fact is that, even when a homeowner can move, he or she cannot take
his or her land along for the ride.37 This asset immobility is a problem for
exit because it means that an exiting homeowner must arrange both to sell
his land in the jurisdiction from which he intends to exit and to purchase
new land in the jurisdiction into which he intends to enter.38 These
transactions—along with mundane tasks like moving one’s belongings—
are costly in terms of both money and time.39
To say that moving simply “cost[s] money” in the sense of transaction
costs,40 however, risks understating the burden in two ways. First, exit for a
homeowner almost always requires the existence of unsatisfied demand for
a home in the jurisdiction of sale and available supply of an acceptably
comparable home in the jurisdiction of purchase. Neither is guaranteed.
Market conditions may be such that it is not feasible to offload burdened
property or to relocate to relatively less burdened property. At a minimum,
the premium the homeowner would have to pay in the jurisdiction of
purchase or suffer in the jurisdiction of sale may be so substantial that it
outweighs whatever gripe he or she had with local government. And
because the price of land in the jurisdiction of sale will reflect the quality of
34. Jerold S. Kayden, National Land-Use Planning in America: Something Whose Time Has
Never Come, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 445, 453 (2000); see Bronin, supra note 2, at 238; Freyfogle,
supra note 2, at 580.
35. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 21 (1970).
36. Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 424 (1956);
see, e.g., Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 506–28 (1991); Rose, supra note 1, at 886–87.
37. See Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1126 (1996) (book
review) (noting that “the potential safeguard of ‘exit’ is blocked” with respect to land “because the
owner cannot pick it up and take it away”).
38. See, e.g., Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The Takings Clause and Local Land
Use Decisions, 59 MD. L. REV. 464, 487 (2000); Richard Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 154–59 (1992); Ilya Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, 2011 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 53, 58–59. Of course, the landowner could choose to retain the land in the jurisdiction from
which he seeks to exit, but that strategy only liberates the landowner, not his valuable asset, from the
local government he seeks to escape.
39. See Fennell, supra note 3, at 626 (“[H]omeowners are often in no position to comparison
shop; moving is relatively costly and may be extraordinarily painful if it means realizing a loss.”).
40. Durchslag, supra note 38, at 511.
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that jurisdiction’s government—particularly its land use policies—the exit
premium ought to be especially high when a locality is poorly governed,
which is precisely when one would want exit to be an effective tool of
accountability.41 Second, for most people, a house is not simply an asset
and a locality is not simply a set of policies. These are homes and
communities in which people invest significant social and emotional
capital, and to which people develop understandable attachments.42 The
prospect of losing the “sense of belonging” that attends long-term
residency in a locality is an additional barrier to effective exit that must not
be underestimated.43
Of course, people can and do change communities all the time
notwithstanding these emotional and practical hurdles, and they may
sometimes do so in response to a locality’s policy choices.44 It is enough
for present purposes to make the simple observations that “[i]t is rare for
homeowners to move just because the public service mix is not to their
liking,” and that exit is at the very least an imperfect proposition given the
price-capitalization problem discussed above.45 Without effective and lowcost means to exit in the face of undesirable policy choices, the ability to
make “an attempt at changing the practices, policies, and outputs” of the
institution by exercising voice, “rather than . . . escap[ing] [it],” is of
paramount importance.46 Local land use processes that are characterized by
a robust participatory democracy give property owners that opportunity.
Property owners’ desire for local democratic control of land use
decisionmaking is also understandable simply as a manifestation of the fact
that the ability to be heard is a “primal” value for many Americans.47
Whether or not it is wholly rational to care about being heard as much as

41. See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 3, at 75 (explaining that, “[b]ecause the
new knowledge [of poor policies] is likely to be public, moving in response to bad news is more
difficult because the seller would get a lower price for her house than otherwise”); Robert Ellickson,
Federalism and Kelo: A Question for Richard Epstein, 44 TULSA L. REV. 751, 762 n.66 (2009); Somin,
supra note 38, at 59.
42. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 35, at 76 (discussing family and community ties as barriers to
exit).
43. Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and
Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 41 (1989); see also Gregory S. Alexander, Conditions of “Voice”:
Passivity, Disappointment, and Democracy in Homeowner Associations, in COMMON INTEREST
COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GOVERNMENT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 145, 153 (Stephen E. Barton &
Carol J. Silverman eds., 1994) (noting that residents “are to a considerable extent locked in” owing to
their investments).
44. Indeed, the degree to which exit is feasible and the costs associated with exit “are empirical
questions” that ultimately “will vary from community to community” and “region to region.”
Durchslag, supra note 38, at 488.
45. FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 3, at 75.
46. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 35, at 30.
47. Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1837
(2015) (“Accountability is primal to American democracy.”).
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people do, and in all of the ways that people do, it cannot seriously be
denied that participatory democracy is widely regarded as a fundamental
feature of American institutions.48 We see responsiveness as having utility
in and of itself, we view participation as an end worth pursuing in politics
and in corporate governance, and we agitate for a voice in our schools, our
associations, and our communities, so that we can express our preferences
and share the relevant information we possess.49 As President Obama put it
in his 2016 State of the Union Address, “[D]emocracy breaks down when
the average person feels their voice doesn’t matter; that the system is
rigged in favor of the rich or the powerful or some special interest.”50
Not only does democracy break down when we feel like we are not
able to make ourselves heard, but the government’s reputation is damaged
in the process. A range of literature in various disciplines has recognized
that one’s perception of government’s responsiveness is associated with
one’s satisfaction with the government’s decisions and with one’s
compliance with the law.51 As Tom Tyler put it, “[l]egal authorities gain
48. See A.E. Dick Howard, Does Federalism Secure or Undermine Rights?, in FEDERALISM AND
RIGHTS 11, 13 (Ellis Katz & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1996) (“The essence of being a citizen is to have the
opportunity, not simply to vote for those who make the laws, but also to have a voice in how decisions
are to be fashioned, what choices to be made.”); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1068 (1980) (describing the widely felt desire for what Hannah Arendt called
“‘public freedom’—the ability to participate actively in the basic societal decisions that affect one’s
life”) (quoting HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 114–15, 119–20 (1962)).
49. See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 47, at 1839 (noting that “[p]ublic participation is
central to executive governance at all levels of government” and arguing that policing warrants increase
democratic accountability); Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 657 (2007)
(noting that public participation “furthers self-fulfillment and self-definition of individual citizens who
play a role in shaping the decisions that affect their lives”).
50. Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 12, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2016/01/12/remarks-president-barack-obama-%E2%80%93-prepared-delivery-state-unionaddress; see also McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1468 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining
that the appearance of corruption, a form of procedural injustice, “can lead the public to believe that its
efforts to communicate with its representatives or to help sway public opinion have little purpose,” and
that “a cynical public can lose interest in political participation altogether”); id. (“Democracy, the Court
has often said, cannot work unless ‘the people have faith in those who govern.’” (quoting United States
v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562 (1961))). Indeed, federal agencies are required to
consider the federalism implications of their regulations specifically because Americans want to be
heard and believe “that issues that are not national in scope or significance are most appropriately
addressed by the level of government closest to the people.” Exec. Order No. 13132, 64 Fed. Reg.
43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999).
51. See, e.g., Karyl A. Kinsey, Deterrence and Alienation Effects of IRS Enforcement: An
Analysis of Survey Data, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 259,
264–76 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Jessica Mantel,
Procedural Safeguards for Agency Guidance: A Source of Legitimacy for the Administrative State, 61
ADMIN. L. REV. 343, 377–79 (2009) (citing studies that observe that “individuals’ judgments about the
fairness of the government’s decisionmaking process, rather than the decisions themselves, dominate
how individuals generalize from their own experience to their overarching views on the legitimacy of
government authorities”); Elizabeth Mullen & Janice Nadler, Moral Spillovers: The Effect of Moral
Violations on Deviant Behavior, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1239, 1244 (2008); Janice
Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1415 (2005); Overton, supra note 49, at 657 (arguing
that the accountability that results from citizens’ ability to be heard “ensures democratic legitimacy,

3 POLLACK - LAND USE - 707-758 (DO NOT DELETE)

718

Alabama Law Review

4/10/2017 1:24 PM

[Vol. 68:3:707

when they receive deference and cooperation from the public,” and such
deference and cooperation are more forthcoming when the public has the
ability to “state [its] views to an authority and to feel that those views are
being considered.”52 For this reason, and particularly given the salience of
land use decisions for property owners, it is in the local government’s
interest to make those decisions with processes that are, and are perceived
to be, fair and open to democratic participation.53
Finally, even setting aside the interests of property owners and of local
governments, local control of land use decisionmaking with processes that
are open to robust participation is most likely to result in contextappropriate land use regulation. As the literature has long recognized, local
government is best positioned to be responsive to community needs and to
react to knowledge about local conditions—an advantage of unique
relevance with respect to wise land use planning.54 While making the most
of that potential no doubt requires that local governments in fact employ
processes that are able to effectively gather that information,55 even a
locality that is only partially open to local participation will often be better
which in turn may increase the likelihood that citizens will voluntarily comply” with government
decisions (footnote omitted)).
52. Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME &
JUST. 283, 283, 300 (2003).
53. Indeed, land use planners understand this dynamic quite well. Because they want residents
“to buy into programs,” they prefer fora that effectively “let[] [residents] have their say” and that give
them a real opportunity to decide for themselves “the kind of landscape they want to inhabit.”
Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 581.
54. See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text; see also BOSSELMAN & CALLIES, supra note 8,
at 3 (noting that “local zoning so strongly emphasizes” “the values of citizen participation and local
control”); Bronin, supra note 2, at 238 (“Scholars have argued that localities should have sole decisionmaking powers over land use because local individuals understand the unique characteristics of their
land better than outsiders do and can therefore make fairer or more competent decisions. By the same
logic, outsiders lack an understanding of how decisions about land use could impact the aesthetic
character, property values, and demographic makeup of the local community.” (footnote omitted));
Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 580 (“Sensible land use decisions require knowledge of the land itself, in its
many variations. . . . Local people typically know the land better than outsiders. For land planning to
prove successful, their knowledge is needed just as much as their cooperation. Then, too, there is the
reality that many land use impacts are primarily local, however widespread their furthest ripples.”);
Ostrow, Process Preemption, supra note 8, at 294 (noting that local officials are “in the best position to
respond to community land use preferences” because they are “both part of and accountable to the local
community”); Serkin, supra note 3, at 1649–50 (explaining that “actual participation in local
decisionmaking is relatively easy” because local meetings “are physically easier to reach than those in
the state capital or Washington, D.C.” and because they are “more accessible in important, intangible
ways” like personal connections and low barriers to entry). The additional common argument in favor
of local control based on its historical pedigree may be of descriptive value, but it has little normative
force of its own. See Buzbee, supra note 1, at 94 (arguing that local control is “not a historical accident”
but rather reflects relative competence of local government to control land use).
55. See Richard Schragger, Flint Wasn’t Allowed Democracy, SLATE (Feb. 8, 2016, 4:57 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/02/a_big_reason_for_the_flint_wa
ter_crisis_no_democracy_there.html (arguing that the Flint water crisis was attributable to the absence
of robust levers of accountability and responsiveness in Flint, which has been run by a state-appointed
city manager rather than a locally elected government).
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than an extralocal land use planner at developing site-specific land use
policies. Any effort on the part of Congress or a federal agency, for
example, to gather local knowledge or to improve upon the pathways of
learning and citizen participation that local governments have at their
disposal would be an “operational nightmare” that would entail substantial
costs only to likely fall short.56
B. Local Democracy and Institutional Decisionmaking
This Article trains its focus on two key pathways by which federal law
can impact these values of participatory democracy in the context of local
land use. The first is that federal law can either create or reduce structural
decisionmaking bias. Specifically, federal law might block pathways
through which people can access decision makers and make their voices
heard, or it might create new pathways or open up existing ones. The
second is that federal law might either harness or silence local expertise
and community knowledge.
Take structural decisionmaking bias first. This is an important measure
of local participatory democracy because, in our political system, the pure
preferences of the people are mediated at all levels of government through
elected or appointed representatives. As a result, evaluating local
democracy is about something other than asking how frequently
preferences become policies. After all, while each representative must be
responsive to his or her constituents, and while each person may make his
or her voice heard, it is rarely if ever the case that all views can be satisfied
or that a single representative or official can carry out the expressed will of
each of his or her constituents on every vote and every issue. A whole set
of people with a range of diverse interests must funnel their preferences
into that single policy maker, who in turn must often negotiate and work
with other policy makers.
Put another way, we want government to hear and be open to people’s
interests and preferences, but we do not necessarily expect it to mirror each
individual’s preferences at all times. Instead, a representative government
is most able to be responsive to the people as a whole where the venues in
which substantive values are debated are “open to those of all viewpoints
on something approaching an equal basis.”57 In such an institution,
56. Kayden, supra note 34, at 451; see also Bronin, supra note 2, at 262–63 & n.147; Durchslag,
supra note 38, at 492; Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 580; Ostrow, Process Preemption, supra note 8, at
296.
57. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 74 (1980). I
recognize that Ely, along with Neil Komesar, whose work I discuss below, set out to conceptualize
democratic malfunctions in order to describe the proper judicial role with respect to governmental
decisionmaking. But while this Article is not concerned specifically with the role of courts in local land
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representative decision makers have a duty “to take into account the
interests of all those their decisions affect,”58 even if they do not have a
duty to do the impossible and enact the will of each and every constituent
at all times.
Malfunctions in a representational system can therefore be understood
as occurring where points of access to decisionmaking processes are
unavailable to some or all of the people governed by the institution in
question.59 This lack of access can arise in a number of ways. The first is
through consciously created barriers. The most straightforward example is
where a majority engages in intentional discrimination to either “chok[e]
off the channels of political change” or to “systematically disadvantag[e]
[the] minority out of simple hostility” or prejudice.60 This type of
malfunction can also occur where a minority special interest captures
government and controls decisionmaking.61 Just as with majoritarian bias,
this sort of minoritarian bias means that “important interests are
unrepresented.”62 Finally, even absent prejudice, this failure of access can
exist where a particular group’s interests—majority or minority or
otherwise—are elevated above the ordinary give-and-take of politics such

use decisionmaking, Ely and Komesar’s accounts of malfunction need not be limited by the particular
response to malfunction that they both studied and, to some extent, advocated. As the following
discussion shows, their insights about how to diagnose a failure of representation are quite adaptable to
this Article’s purposes. Moreover, shifting the focus away from judicial intervention avoids a common
critique of Ely’s work, which is that it can only “identif[y], in a value-neutral manner, . . . areas in
which legislative decisionmaking suffers from systemic biases,” but cannot help courts avoid making
“the same sort of substantive value choices inherent in ordinary legislative decisionmaking.” Michael J.
Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 783 (1991)
(emphasis omitted). This Article uses Ely and Komesar’s accounts of malfunction only to do the former
(i.e., the thing those accounts are best suited to do): diagnose the creation or reduction of systemic bias.
58. ELY, supra note 57, at 100; see Howard, supra note 48, at 19 (“Representative government
requires that the connection between the governors and the governed not simply take place on election
day; there must be the continuing opportunity for citizens to tell office-holders just what is on their
minds.”); see also Overton, supra note 49, at 657 (noting that full and open participation “exposes
decision-makers to a variety of ideas and viewpoints, which ensures fully informed decisions”).
59. See Wendy Wagner, The Participation-Centered Model Meets Administrative Process, 2013
WIS. L. REV. 671, 690 (offering similar definition focused on circumstances in which limited access
points and varied levels of information costs create “an institutional process that . . . is not equally open
to all participants”).
60. ELY, supra note 57, at 103; see WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 121 (1995) [hereinafter FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS] (expressing Ely’s
concern as “making sure that democracy does not systematically exclude people from the process”).
61. See generally Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985).
62. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 214 (1994) [hereinafter KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES]; see
id. at 26–27 (noting the “two traditional and paradoxically opposite perceptions of political
malfunction—the overrepresentation of concentrated interests (special interest legislation) and the
overrepresentation of dispersed larger interests (the tyranny of the majority)”).
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that the group is immunized from the obligation to “pull, haul, and trade” in
order to see its preferences enacted into law.63
In addition to these conscious or intentional blockages, failures of
access can also inhere in the structure of a decisionmaking system itself.64
This form of representational malfunction must not be discounted because
decisionmaking bias is not just the province of malicious individuals in
positions of power. Rather, good and well-intentioned people are capable
of biased decisionmaking too if they are supplied with biased information,
bound by skewed voting rules, or locked into a narrow set of possible
decisions.65 And a biased information supply can exist not only because of
conscious efforts on the part of representatives to listen only to particular
voices but also because of structural factors like high information and
organizational costs that affect the ability of particular groups to make
themselves heard.66 It is therefore necessary to account for “forces
permeating the entire political process” that can limit the effective exercise
of voice.67
In short, while animus against minorities is of course one especially
pernicious form of structural bias, it does not define the extent of the
potential problem. Rather, failures of representational responsiveness exist
where aspects of the decisionmaking process—procedures, voting rules, or
other limitations on an institution’s room to maneuver—either intentionally
or unintentionally block pathways of access and voice.
Note that this account is not focused on the substantive values that the
government adopts or enacts into law, but rather on the ways in which the
government sets policy, receives information, and makes decisions. By
remaining agnostic on the outputs of the decisionmaking process, this
evaluative approach avoids becoming bound up in the evaluator’s
subjective preferences with respect to particular decisions. Moreover, while
there might be circumstances in which a particular outcome might be
63. Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994); see FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS,
supra note 60, at 367 (noting the danger for representation when local decisionmaking is “insulated
from the give-and-take of pluralistic policies” and where regulation impacts property owners “for whom
political coalitions are unlikely prospects”).
64. See Neil K. Komesar, A Job for the Judges: The Judiciary and the Constitution in a Massive
and Complex Society, 86 MICH. L. REV. 657, 683 n.52 (1988) [hereinafter Komesar, A Job for the
Judges] (defining malfunction as the failure of a system to represent citizen interests).
65. See id. at 680.
66. See KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 62, at 71–75, 83–84, 91 (discussing
organizational costs, free-rider problems, and other similar barriers); Komesar, A Job for the Judges,
supra note 64, at 673.
67. Komesar, A Job for the Judges, supra note 64, at 677–78 (“Once one considers the
implications of these systemic forces, a conception of political malfunction based on the personal
animus or stereotyping of legislators seems too limited a basis for defining political malfunction.”); see
FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 60, at 123 (noting problem of “institutional traps” that
undermine responsiveness); id. at 324 (describing failures of political process as occurring where “the
protections of . . . political voice are forestalled at the local level”).

3 POLLACK - LAND USE - 707-758 (DO NOT DELETE)

722

Alabama Law Review

4/10/2017 1:24 PM

[Vol. 68:3:707

welcomed or considered good for the general welfare regardless of how it
was reached—the kind of thing that an outcome-focused approach would
capture—ending the analysis there risks assuming that the outcome could
not have been reached in a better, more participatory way. Focusing on
how the government made or could have made that decision, by contrast,
allows us to question that assumption and to weigh the desired outcome
against our ideals of participation and responsiveness.68 Finally, evaluating
the opportunities for participation in the decisionmaking system maps
directly onto the very values that, as discussed above, ground the pervasive
preference for local control of land use decisionmaking.69
The second component of participation and responsiveness is the
degree to which local government is structurally able or encouraged to
absorb community knowledge and to act in response to it. As discussed
above, the inputs that the people provide for local government are not just
their views on outcomes, but also information they possess about the facts
on the ground and about the potential impacts of particular decisions. So
just as a failure of local democracy can occur where pathways of voice are
systematically blocked, a similar failure can occur where decisionmaking is
systematically divorced from community knowledge. This may be because
local government has chosen to be blind to information from particular
sources or communities, or it may be because aspects of the
decisionmaking process prevent local government either from accessing
that information or from acting on it.
Before moving on, one piece of clarification is in order. By developing
this account of participation and responsiveness, I make no baseline claim
about the degree to which local governments are open to or responsive to
community preferences or knowledge in the absence of national
intervention.70 Instead, this Article, like the conversation it seeks to shape,
is about our reactions to land use law at the federal level and the need to
account for the varying impacts of the options in the federal government’s
tool kit. It therefore focuses on federally imposed changes to local
government decisionmaking, and the effect of such interventions. For all

68. See infra Part IV.
69. See supra Part I.A.
70. For example, David Schleicher has observed that there are reasons to doubt the quality of
state democracy and its ability to “produce policies or outcomes that are responsive to preferences of
residents of the state.” David Schleicher, Federalism and State Democracy, 95 TEX. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 7), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2739791.
While his focus is on state government—an institution beyond the focus of this Article—and while he
concedes that his claims carry less weight with respect to local government (particularly smaller local
governments), id. at 3, 16, the point is well-taken. Indeed, this concern about the quality of local
democracy only makes more salient the need Schleicher recognizes to “enhanc[e]” local democracy. Id.
at 10. As discussed in Part III, infra, certain nationalizing mechanisms carry that precise potential, and
they do so by bypassing possible electoral pathologies.

3 POLLACK - LAND USE - 707-758 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

4/10/2017 1:24 PM

Land Use Federalism’s False Choice

723

the reasons discussed in this Part, whether local government is highly
responsive or nonresponsive, federal laws that make it less responsive are
presumptively more troubling than laws that do not. And while there may
be circumstances where that presumption could be overcome, making such
a claim requires understanding the full set of nationalizing options, the
democratic costs associated with those options, and the stakes associated
with incurring those costs. The balance of this Article explores these
concerns.
II. DESIGN CHOICES FOR NATIONALIZING LAND USE LAWS
To evaluate the democratic costs of federal laws that nationalize local
land use decisionmaking, we next need to recognize and understand their
diversity. Without such an understanding, the evaluative task can too easily
devolve into one-off policy assessments that do not yield much in the way
of broader insights. Or worse, it can reduce to the facile and misplaced
denunciation of any use of any national tool in the context of local land use
as wrong. To begin to explore which national tools are most threatening—
or most beneficial—for local democracy, this Part offers a descriptive
account of the menu of choices that federal legislators must make when
designing laws that nationalize land use. First, what is the purpose of the
nationalization? Second, what restrictions will be imposed? And third, how
will those restrictions be conveyed and enforced?
A. Why Nationalize
The question of what goal Congress might want to achieve when
nationalizing land use decisionmaking is both theoretical and bounded by
doctrine. Congress, after all, can only act pursuant to its enumerated
powers, so like any federal law, a nationalizing land use law must be linked
to such a power.
1. Regulating Markets
The first basis for nationalization is to regulate markets and mitigate
market failures. Congress may choose to intervene in local land use
decisionmaking where there are collective action problems, where
disuniformity is to be avoided, where there is a danger of free-riding, or
where action by states and localities generates negative externalities.71
71. See Serkin, supra note 3, at 1677–78 (discussing ways in which localities may site
undesirable land uses close to neighbors or impose growth controls that effectively export density and
other costs of growth into neighboring areas).
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These various problems can make the establishment of networks in which
goods or services can be delivered difficult or impossible, and in so doing
they can generate substantial inefficiencies. Further, these inefficiencies
represent real harms to communities, natural environments, and livelihoods
that an individual local government cannot unilaterally abate. Such a state
of affairs is one in which the federal government might use its authority
“[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States”72 in order to
coordinate and impose regulations, uniform standards, cost-sharing
requirements, and the like.
Examples of federal Commerce Clause intervention to address market
failures in the land use context abound. One example is the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA), which was enacted “to promote
competition and higher quality in American telecommunications services
and to ‘encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications
technologies.’”73 Among many other policy innovations, the TCA aimed to
enhance nationwide cell phone coverage.
At the time, one of the primary obstacles to cell service was stiff local
opposition to the necessary infrastructure, specifically cell phone towers.74
A classic reflection of NIMBYism, this opposition was likely bolstered by
the fact that relatively few Americans even had cell phones in 1996.75 But
while each locality’s decision to reject a cell phone tower or to impose
specific conditions on siting, form, and the like benefited the immediate
community (by minimizing, offsetting, or preventing aesthetic damage), it
harmed the rest of the region and the country (by interfering with uniform
cell coverage). Local land use decisionmaking thus stood in the way of a
smoothly functioning national market. As the House Report on the bill that
would become the TCA put it, local land use decisionmaking was
“creat[ing] an inconsistent and, at times, conflicting patchwork of
requirements.”76 And because neither neighboring communities nor
regional interests could override the locality’s authority to exclude, this
coordination problem “inhibit[ed] the deployment” of cell phone service.77
Congress could, of course, have chosen to leave cell tower siting
entirely in the hands of localities, notwithstanding these problems. The
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
73.
City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 115 (2005) (quoting
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)).
74. See Ostrow, Process Preemption, supra note 8, at 319 & n.198 (collecting sources).
75. In 1996, roughly 44 million Americans were cell phone subscribers. See Background on
CTIA’s Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA—WIRELESS ASS’N 2 (2014) https://web.archive.org/web/
20160713153714/http://www.ctia.org/docs/default-source/Facts-Stats/ctia_survey_ye_2013_graphicsfinal.pdf?sfvrsn=2. In 2013, that number had increased by 660%: over 335 million Americans used cell
phones. Id.
76. H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, at 94 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 61.
77. Id.
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Senate version of the TCA would have done just that.78 But the version of
the bill that was drafted in the House of Representatives, and that
ultimately became law, embraced the rationale of nationalizing an aspect of
land use decisionmaking in order to foster a coherent and efficient
market.79 The House concluded that “it is in the national interest that
uniform, consistent requirements . . . be established as soon as possible” so
as to “speed deployment and the availability of competitive wireless
telecommunications services which ultimately will provide consumers with
lower costs as well as with a greater range [of] options for such services.”80
2. Protecting Rights
The second goal that a land use nationalization might be designed to
achieve is the enforcement of a constitutional right that Congress thinks
localities are failing to protect—either because they are violating that right
themselves or because they are permitting violations to occur. While the
original constitutional design allocated to Congress no such authority, the
Reconstruction Amendments enacted in the wake of the Civil War do.
Specifically, Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, like Section Two
of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, gives Congress the authority
to “enforce, by appropriate legislation,” the provisions of those
Amendments.81 And as the Supreme Court incorporated most of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress’s remedial power concomitantly grew to
embrace the protection of those rights as well.
One of the statutes that Congress has enacted pursuant to this authority
is a major land use law: the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA). Understanding RLUIPA requires a bit of history,
beginning with a 1990 case upholding a state law prohibiting the use of
peyote even when used in religious rituals.82 In Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources v. Smith, the Supreme Court ruled that
such a “neutral law of general applicability” is constitutional even if it

78. H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 207 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10,
222; see also Ostrow, Land Law, supra note 1, at 1419.
79. To be sure, Congress was likely influenced by the lobbying and persuasion of
telecommunications companies that were able to coordinate more effectively at the federal level than
were diffuse local interests. But what the telecommunications companies were seeking, and what
Congress created, was a more uniform decisionmaking regime that would be more receptive to their
market goals.
80. H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, at 94.
81. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see also id. amend. XIII, § 2 (giving Congress the “power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation”); id. amend. XV, § 2 (same).
82. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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imposes a substantial burden on a religious practice.83 Congress was
displeased with a holding that it saw as insufficiently protective of religious
freedom,84 so it enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in
1993 to prohibit federal, state, and local governments from “substantially
burden[ing]” a person’s exercise of religion—even by way of a neutral law
of general applicability—unless the government in question could satisfy a
version of strict scrutiny.85 To justify imposing this limitation on the set of
policies that state and local governments could enact or apply, Congress
relied on Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.86
The Supreme Court soon rebuffed this effort, however, and held in City
of Boerne v. Flores that RFRA was not “appropriate legislation” to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive rights guarantees—specifically,
the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.87 The Court concluded that
such prophylactic rules are only appropriate remedial measures under
Section Five where there is “a congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”88
With respect to RFRA, Congress had failed to demonstrate that its strong
medicine was responsive to any “pattern of religious discrimination in this
country.”89
Congress returned to the drawing board to craft a religious liberty
statute that would apply against states and localities but would survive the
Court’s review. It therefore focused on those areas of state and local law
for which it thought it could build a sufficient record of religious
discrimination. The result was RLUIPA: a mini-RFRA focused in large
part on local land use.90
Though Congress invoked other enumerated powers in addition to
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment in an effort to bolster

83. Id. at 879. Laws that “discriminate[] against some or all religious beliefs or [that] regulate[]
or prohibit[] conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons” are not “neutral” and remain
prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 532 (1993).
84. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997) (“Congress enacted RFRA in direct
response to the Court’s decision in [Smith].”).
85. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1, 2000bb-2(1) (2012).
86. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 516–17. The portion of RFRA incumbent on the federal
government needs no such foundation, as Congress is free to legislate limits on its own lawmaking
authority. It has nonetheless garnered criticism on its merits. See, e.g., MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS.
THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 7–9, 274, 298–302 (2005); Marci A. Hamilton, RFRA
PERILS, http://www.rfraperils.com (last visited Feb. 12, 2017) (describing the “RFRA culture war”).
87. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517, 536.
88. Id. at 520.
89. Id. at 531.
90. As its title indicates, RLUIPA also covers the treatment of institutionalized persons, but those
provisions are beyond the scope of this Article.
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RLUIPA’s constitutionality,91 RLUIPA remains best understood as a
rights-protecting nationalization rather than a market-regulating
nationalization because of the nature of what Congress aimed to
accomplish. Moreover, because these other bases of authority have more
limited reaches, RLUIPA is, as discussed below, at its most potent only
with the aid of Section Five.92
B. What Restrictions to Impose
The next choice Congress must make is what type of restriction to
impose on local decisionmaking. Both market regulation and rights
protection can be accomplished by means that fall into two basic
categories.
1. Decision-Displacing Rules
First, Congress can displace local decisionmaking by restricting the set
of actions that localities can permissibly take. If Congress perceives a
market failure or an externality it would like to see abated, or a right it
would like to see protected, it can simply forbid outcomes that are
inconsistent with those goals or demand outcomes that advance those goals.
The most salient example of a decision-displacing rule in the land use
context is RLUIPA. RLUIPA provides that “[n]o government shall impose
or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial
burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly
or institution,” unless imposing the burden furthers a compelling
governmental interest and represents the least restrictive means of doing
so.93 This provision displaces local decisionmaking because it carves out a
set of outcomes a locality might reach—those that impose substantial
burdens on religious exercise but that do not further compelling
governmental interests and that are not the least restrictive means of doing
so—and declares them off limits.
The statute applies this displacing rule to three categories of cases, each
corresponding to a distinct lever of constitutional authority: (1) those in
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2) (2012) (invoking the Commerce Clause and the Spending
Clause as well as Section Five); Schragger, supra note 4, at 1838–39 (noting same).
92. See infra notes 94–101 and accompanying text.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). RLUIPA defines religious exercise as including “any exercise of
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” Id. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).
The statute also provides that its protections “shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of
religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.”
Id. § 2000cc-3(g). Finally, the statute explains that the “use, building, or conversion of real property for
the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered to be religious exercise of the person or entity that
uses or intends to use the property for that purpose.” Id. § 2000cc-5(7)(B).
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which the burden is imposed in a program that receives federal money;94
(2) those in which the burden affects interstate or foreign commerce;95 and
(3) those in which the burden is imposed “in the implementation of a land
use regulation or system of land use regulations, under which a government
makes, or has in place formal or informal procedures or practices that
permit the government to make, individualized assessments of the proposed
uses for the property involved.”96 The first is premised on Congress’s
spending power (a concept further discussed below97), the second on its
Commerce Clause power, and the third on its remedial power under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.98 Additionally, RLUIPA
prohibits governments from implementing land use regulations that either
“totally exclude[]” religious organizations from a jurisdiction or that
“unreasonably limit[]” them within the jurisdiction.99
The third category of cases to which the substantial burden standard
applies—the one about land use regulations in which the government
makes individualized assessments—sweeps up a substantial swath of local
land use decisionmaking. Indeed, it describes the nature of nearly every
local land use decision other than the creation of a zoning plan or ordinance
in the first instance. Decisions to grant or deny variances, building permits,
landmark statuses, and the like are all examples of decisions made as part
of a system of individualized assessments: they all involve the application
of particular facts or circumstances to the governing rules embodied in a
local land use ordinance or zoning plan.100 RLUIPA’s largest piece thus
imposes a decision-displacing nationalization on even those local decisions
that have no impact on interstate or foreign commerce and no relationship
with a federal spending program.101 Instead, RLUIPA displaces those

94. Id. § 2000cc(a)(2)(A).
95. Id. § 2000cc(a)(2)(B).
96. Id. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C).
97. See infra notes 119–127.
98. See 146 Cong. Rec. S7774, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch
and Sen. Kennedy identifying the three distinct jurisdictional hooks and mapping them onto the three
categories of cases).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(3). RLUIPA also requires that governments treat religious and
nonreligious land uses on equal terms, and prohibits governments from discriminating on the basis of
religion. Id. § 2000cc(b)(1)–(2). These provisions more closely echo existing constraints imposed by
the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses, and so are not further discussed in this Article.
100. See Adam J. MacLeod, Identifying Values in Land Use Regulation, 101 KY. L.J. 55, 58
(2012) (“Common individualized assessments include decisions about conditional use permits,
variances, and spot re-zoning.”).
101. RLUIPA makes clear that these jurisdictional hooks may not be cross-applied to distinct
circumstances by providing a limitation on the judicial relief available to a plaintiff in the event that the
Commerce Clause hook is not satisfied. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(g).

3 POLLACK - LAND USE - 707-758 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

Land Use Federalism’s False Choice

4/10/2017 1:24 PM

729

decisions for the express purpose of protecting religious rights the federal
government thinks are underprotected at the local level.102
2. Decision-Channeling Rules
Rather than displace local decisions, Congress might instead channel
local decisionmaking by erecting deliberative hoops through which a state
or locality must jump before it is permitted to work its will.103 In other
words, the locality may be left free to reach whatever solution it chooses,
so long as it structures its decisionmaking in certain ways and around
certain required steps.104 A Congress that enacts such a decision-channeling
rule is, of course, not truly agnostic about outcomes. Far from it, such a
Congress chooses to act because it has identified a problem worth solving
and because it has a particular preferred national outcome. But it leaves
localities with space to choose their own precise paths, rather than exclude
possible outcomes altogether.105
102. Though this Article’s primary concern is not with the size of the federal footprint, but rather
with its character and shape, an underappreciated recent development in RLUIPA’s reach makes this
Article’s implications all the more salient. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Supreme Court
held that RFRA’s coverage of “person[s]” includes closely held for-profit corporations. 134 S. Ct. 2751,
2767–75 (2014). It also may have lowered the “substantial burden” bar at least somewhat. See id. at
2775–79 (a substantial burden exists where government demands that persons “engage in conduct that
seriously violates their religious beliefs” and accompanies that demand with “economic consequences
[that] will be severe”); see also Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1560–61 (2016) (declining to
address whether having to state one’s religious objection constitutes a substantial burden when the
government takes responsive action to achieve its ends, and remanding). Though the Court has never
decided a RLUIPA case having to do with the land use provisions, it and various lower courts have
explained that RLUIPA’s language ought to be interpreted in pari materia with RFRA’s. See, e.g.,
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761, 2781; Redd v. Wright, 597 F.3d 532, 535 n.2 (2d Cir. 2010); Adkins
v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 567–68 (5th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, it is plausible that RLUIPA’s protection
could extend to for-profit businesses just like Hobby Lobby, and that those businesses could more
easily claim that a land use decision violates RLUIPA. This observation went unaddressed in Hobby
Lobby itself and has received relatively little attention in the wake of that decision. But see Bray, supra
note 18, at 55–58, 92–94; Ross Campbell, Note, Hobby Lobby as a Land Use Case: Charting ForProfit RLUIPA Claims, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 884 (2016); Stephen R. Miller, Hobby Lobby’s
“Passing Strange” Interpretation of RLUIPA: An Unlikely, but Potentially Dramatic, Impact on Land
Use Law?, LAND USE PROF BLOG (July 1, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/land_use/2014/07/
hobby-lobbys-passing-strange-interpretation-of-rluipa-and-the-cases-unlikely-but-potentiallychillin.html.
103. Cf. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004) (contrasting constraints that “alter the
range of conduct” in which an actor may engage with those that “regulate only the manner of
determining” the outcome).
104. While scholars of cooperative federalism have recognized that “Congress may not only
displace the states through federal law but also empower the states by conferring resources and new
forms of authority on them,” Bulman-Pozen, supra note 24, at 968, this account is incomplete because
it does not emphasize this channeling option. (The displacing mechanism has already been discussed,
and the discussion below about incentives captures much of the empowerment option. See infra Part
II.C.2).
105. Cf. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (noting that the choice of process
“may have . . . some effect on the likelihood that” a particular outcome will be reached, but does not
control outcomes).
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This mechanism may sound less onerous from a practical perspective,
but this is not necessarily so. Indeed, decision-channeling nationalizations
may impose substantial costs on states and localities that decisiondisplacing nationalizations avoid. New hoops will entail not only the direct
costs of jumping through them but also a broader set of costs associated
with hiring more employees and creating new processes or agencies. These
may even raise concerns about states and localities being “conscript[ed]
in[to] ‘the national bureaucratic army.’”106 Finally, a local decision maker
might prefer to have his decision imposed exogenously. In that case, he
would be able to invest fewer resources in decisionmaking and might even
escape electoral responsibility if his constituents do not like the result.
The TCA is a classic decision-channeling statute. After initially
considering a decision-displacing “uniform policy” governing the siting of
cell towers,107 Congress ultimately required that a locality that receives an
application to build or modify a cell tower must act on the request “within a
reasonable period of time” and, in the event that it denies the request, must
issue a decision that is “in writing” and is “supported by substantial
evidence contained in a written record.”108 Any person “adversely affected”
by the locality’s decision or by the locality’s failure to make a timely
decision may, within thirty days, commence a lawsuit in federal court and
have that suit heard and decided “on an expedited basis.”109
The effect of these federally imposed decisionmaking constraints is to
place a framework generally applicable to federal administrative agencies
onto the shoulders of localities. This is not to say that the TCA subjects
localities to each and every provision of the Administrative Procedure Act,
but when Congress prescribed that a locality “shall” act within a reasonable
period of time and “shall” issue any denials in writing and with substantial

106. T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808, 824 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(quoting FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)); see Petersburg Cellular P’ship v. Bd. of Supervisors, 205 F.3d 688, 697–705 (4th
Cir. 2000) (Niemeyer, J.) (arguing that the channeling component of the TCA unconstitutionally
commandeers localities in violation of the Tenth Amendment); cf. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735
(noting in the criminal context a reluctance to impose procedural requirements on states so as to “avoid
intruding more than necessary upon the States’ sovereign administration of their criminal justice
systems”).
107. H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 207 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10,
222; see Petersburg Cellular, 205 F.3d at 698 (Niemeyer, J.) (noting that the House proposal “would
have given authority to the [FCC] to regulate directly the siting of towers”); Ostrow, Land Law, supra
note 1, at 1419 (explaining that the House “first considered granting the [FCC] exclusive siting
authority over telecommunications towers” and that this proposal “would have entirely preempted the
local land-use process”).
108. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii)–(iii) (2012).
109. Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
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evidence contained in a written record,110 it subjected localities to what it
understood to be “the traditional standard used for judicial review of
agency actions.”111 As the Supreme Court recently clarified in T-Mobile
South, L.L.C. v. City of Roswell, Congress’s use of the term “substantial
evidence” “invoked” the body of federal administrative law that requires
that agencies “‘articulate . . . satisfactory explanation[s] for [their]
action[s].’”112 Congress, the Court explained, accordingly did not just
require localities to take actions supported by substantial evidence, but to
actually “state . . . reasons” that are themselves rooted in substantial
evidence.113 Those reasons could be stated in a variety of formats or
documents, including but not limited to the writing that communicates the
denial, but they still must be stated “clearly enough to enable judicial
review.”114 The only caveat, the Court emphasized, is that a locality that
chooses to state its reasons in writing separately from the writing
communicating the denial of a siting application must do so “at essentially
the same time as it communicates its denial.”115
Note that only decisions to deny siting applications are subject to the
full set of hoops imposed by this channeling rule. All requests must be
acted upon in a reasonable period of time, and all final actions or failures to
act are subject to expedited judicial review, but only those decisions “to
deny . . . request[s] to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service
facilities” need be in writing and supported by written reasons which are
themselves supported by substantial evidence contained in a written
record.116 Quite plainly, this differential treatment was rooted in Congress’s
perception of the problem: localities were underprotecting the interests of
telecommunications companies, subscribers, and the national
telecommunications network, while overprotecting the exclusionary
interests of residents. But rather than displace local decisionmaking in
order to expand telecommunications networks, Congress channeled local
deliberative processes with reason-giving requirements.117
110. Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii)–(iii); see City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 128
(Breyer, J., concurring) (observing that the TCA “requires local zoning boards . . . [to] maintain a
‘written record’ and give reasons for denials ‘in writing’”).
111. H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 208 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10,
223.
112. 135 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2015) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)); see id. at 822 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (agreeing on this
point).
113. Id. at 815 (majority opinion).
114. Id. at 816.
115. Id.
116. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (2012).
117. To be sure, the TCA also contains a few components that may appear to be weakly
displacing. It forbids a locality from “unreasonably” discriminating among “providers of functionally
equivalent services,” provides that a locality’s siting regulations and decisions “shall not prohibit or
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C. How to Nationalize
Once Congress has identified a problem that it wishes to solve and is
authorized to solve, and once it has chosen a restriction to impose, the last
question it must answer is how to implement that restriction.
1. Fiat
Congress’s first option is simply to demand compliance with its
restriction by fiat. The Commerce Clause and the Reconstruction
Amendments, coupled with the Supremacy Clause, give Congress the
authority to do exactly that, and Congress might choose to rely exclusively
on that authority. The TCA and two pieces of RLUIPA—the Section Five
and Commerce Clause pieces discussed above—take this form: they both
set out requirements with which localities must comply. A locality that
does not comply with those federal commands can be sued in federal court
by a prospective land user that wishes to avail itself of the protections of
federal law, be they decision-displacing or decision-channeling, and can be
enjoined from acting contrary to federal law.118
2. Incentive
Rather than demand compliance by fiat, Congress may attempt to elicit
voluntary compliance by conditioning the receipt of federal funding on the
adoption by states and localities of particular outcomes or decisionmaking
practices. When Congress acts in this fashion, it does so on the basis of a
third constitutional hook: its “spending power.”119 The Supreme Court has
have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services,” and prohibits a locality from
making siting decisions on the basis of alleged environmental effects of cell tower radio frequency
emissions so long as the towers comply with FCC regulations on the topic. Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i), (iv).
But these are not displacing rules to the same degree that RLUIPA is. The first is a simple
antidiscrimination mandate under which a locality cannot unreasonably prefer Verizon towers to TMobile towers. It can, however, prefer the former to the latter if doing so is not unreasonable, and it can
treat both Verizon and T-Mobile towers as generously or as harshly as it wants. The second prohibits a
locality from banning all cell towers, but says nothing about individual cases. Finally, the third prohibits
localities from relying on one particular basis for its decision, but leaves the locality free to reach any
decision it wants on any other bases.
118. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a) (2012) (providing that “[a] person may assert a violation
of [RLUIPA] as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a
government”); id. § 2000cc-2(c) (providing that a state court adjudication of a claimed RLUIPA
violation “shall not be entitled to full faith and credit in a Federal court unless the claimant had a full
and fair adjudication of that claim in the non-Federal forum”); 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (providing
that “[a]ny person adversely affected by any final action or failure to act by a State or local government
or any instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with” the TCA provisions discussed here may sue in
“any court of competent jurisdiction”).
119. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
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long upheld the power of Congress to “attach conditions on the receipt of
federal funds” in order to “‘further broad policy objectives.’”120 In fact, the
Court has held that when Congress takes this particular tack, it is not
limited by the enumerated powers directly granted to it in the
Constitution.121 Instead, objectives outside of Congress’s powers “may
nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending power and the
conditional grant of federal funds” so long as the objective “serve[s]
general public purposes”; the conditions and consequences are
noncoercive, unambiguously stated, and relate “to the federal interest in
particular national projects or programs”; and neither the objective nor the
conditions are independently barred by other constitutional provisions.122
The requirement that the conditions and consequences be noncoercive
is perhaps the most restrictive of the requirements, but while it has been the
source of the most litigation, it does not ultimately appear to be an
especially strong constraint on Congress. While the Court has refrained
from drawing any bright lines, its most recent statements in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB) suggest that
Congress crosses the line somewhere after its conditions imperil 0.5% of a
state’s total budget and somewhere before they threaten 10% of a state’s
total budget.123 The latter amounts to “economic dragooning that leaves the
States with no real option but to acquiesce,”124 whereas the former
constitutes “relatively mild encouragement” that is permissible because it
leaves states with a choice, “not merely in theory but in fact.”125 Moreover,
the Court has suggested that unconstitutional coercion is more likely to
arise, if anywhere, with respect to threats of withdrawals of funding, rather
than to conditional grants of funding.126 Accordingly, Congress has a quite
Welfare of the United States.”); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (Burger, C.J.)
(plurality opinion).
120. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 474); see
Buzbee, supra note 1, at 107–08 (discussing the “basic concept” of conditional federal spending).
121. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686 (1999)
(“Congress may, in the exercise of its spending power, condition its grant of funds to the States upon
their taking certain actions that Congress could not require them to take, and . . . acceptance of the funds
entails an agreement to the actions.”); see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992)
(explaining that Congress may “encourage a State to regulate in a particular way, [and] hold out
incentives to the States as a method of influencing a State’s policy choices”).
122. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08, 211.
123. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604–06 (2012) (plurality opinion) (contrasting the statute in Dole, which
imperiled less than 0.5% of the state’s budget, with the Affordable Care Act, which threatened “over 10
percent,” and noting that “[i]t is enough for today that wherever that line may be, this statute is surely
beyond it”).
124. Id. at 2605.
125. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211–12.
126. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603 (framing the States’ objection to the Medicaid expansion as
being to the fact that, “[i]nstead of simply refusing to grant the new funds to States that will not accept
the new conditions, Congress has also threatened to withhold those States’ existing Medicaid funds”);
id. at 2607 (“Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress from offering funds under the Affordable Care
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broad remit to use federal dollars to encourage states and localities to take
actions consistent with federal goals.127
Congress has used some form of this particular nationalizing option in
a number of land use statutes aimed at protecting the environment. Many of
these, however, are designed primarily to incentivize states rather than
localities by offering funding to state coffers—which can then disburse
money to localities.128 While statutes like these may call for or even require
local involvement in state decisionmaking, the interposed presence of the
state government between the locality and the federal government makes
such statutes somewhat distinct from the likes of RLUIPA and the TCA,
which operate directly on localities. While the impacts of federal law on
state government are beyond the scope of this Article, these statutes
provide useful illustrations of this category of federal legislative action.
Moreover, the federal government can also engage in this type of
arrangement with localities directly.
One frequently cited example of an incentive-based land use
nationalization that operates as a conditional grant is the Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972 (CZMA).129 The CZMA was enacted to advance
the “national interest in the effective management, beneficial use,
protection, and development of the coastal zone,” and to “preserve, protect,
develop, and where possible, to restore or enhance, the resources of the
Nation’s coastal zone for this and succeeding generations.”130 The statute
seeks to achieve these ends through the development at the state level of
plans that govern land use decisionmaking in ways that protect coastal
zones, comply with broad federal standards, and are developed in
coordination with and assure the “full participation” of localities.131 In this
way, the CZMA takes the form of a decision-channeling rule: it does not
prescribe or forbid particular decisions, but shapes the way in which
decisions are reached. But rather than impose that channeling rule by fiat,

Act to expand the availability of health care, and requiring that States accepting such funds comply with
the conditions on their use. What Congress is not free to do is to penalize States that choose not to
participate in that new program by taking away their existing Medicaid funding.”).
127. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Viva Conditional Federal Spending!, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 93, 95 (2014) (concluding that, under NFIB, unconstitutional coercion arises primarily where
Congress conditions continued participation in a “very large” and “preexisting conditional spending
program” on participation “in an entirely separate and distinct program”).
128. See Ostrow, Land Law, supra note 1, at 1427 (collecting examples).
129. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2012); see, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 1, at 110–11; Ostrow, Land
Law, supra note 1, at 1429; Salkin, supra note 10, at 278–79.
130. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451(a), 1452(1); see Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1,
59 (2011) (explaining that the CZMA was “designed to protect coastal resources from intense
development pressures that isolated local land use planning could no longer contain”). “Coastal zone” is
defined, in lengthy detail, at 16 U.S.C. § 1453(1)–(4), but it essentially includes any oceanfront, Great
Lake, or connecting bays and estuaries, as well as any adjacent shoreland.
131. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(1), (3)(B).
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the CZMA incentivizes its adoption. Grant money is offered for the
purpose of the state’s administration of a CZMA plan, and states that do
not create such plans suffer no consequence other than simply not receiving
the associated grant money.132 In this way, participation in the CZMA’s
channeling regime is “entirely voluntary.”133
Additionally, Congress has at times bypassed the states and directly
offered substate actors money to fund certain federally favored land use
actions. For example, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century
(TEA-21) marked a “small break” from the traditional funding preference
for highway construction and offered localities and substate regional
transportation agencies funding for other types of transportation projects
that reduced congestion and furthered other federal environmental policy
goals.134 Portions of the Housing Act of 1937—still in effect today—
employ similarly targeted funding to encourage and subsidize the siting and
creation of low-income public housing approved by and in partnership with
local public housing authorities.135 These types of funding programs
demonstrate that Congress can shape the direction of local land use in favor
of certain federal priorities by offering funding directly to localities and
substate entities. Setting aside other budgetary constraints, Congress could
certainly engage in more land use nationalization of this type if it chose.136
In addition to this form of “carrot,” Congress could also resort to the
“stick” of threatening to withdraw funding for certain local programs if
localities do not follow a federally preferred land use policy.

132. Id. § 1455(a)–(c); Ryan, supra note 130, at 59.
133. Ostrow, Land Law, supra note 1, at 1429; see 136 Cong. Rec. E542 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1990)
(statement of Rep. Walter B. Jones) (same); FRED P. BOSSELMAN, DUANE FEURER & TOBIN M.
RICHTER, FEDERAL LAND USE REGULATION 215 (1977) (same).
134. Buzbee, supra note 1, at 111; see Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L.
No. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 23 U.S.C.); Ostrow,
Land Law, supra note 1, at 1427; TEA-21 – A Summary – Protecting Our Environment, FED. HIGHWAY
ADMIN., http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/tea21/sumenvir.htm (last updated Apr. 5, 2011). Funding for the
TEA-21 in particular was always set to lapse after 2003, see TEA-21: Moving Americans into the 21st
Century, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/tea21/index.htm (last visited Feb. 14,
2017), but the Department of Transportation continues to draw on other appropriation streams to fund
local transportation projects.
135. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437–1437f (2012); see Robert C. Ellickson, The False Promise of the MixedIncome Housing Project, 57 UCLA L. REV. 983, 989–90 (2010).
136. As they grant the money they are appropriated by Congress, federal agencies engage in
quite a bit of this sort of incentive-based nationalization of land use priorities as well. See, e.g., About
Us, PARTNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES, http://www.sustainablecommunities.gov/
mission/about-us (last updated Mar. 2, 2015) (interagency partnership between HUD, DOT, and EPA
formed to “improve access to affordable housing, increase transportation options, and lower
transportation costs while protecting the environment”).
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***
Beyond the statutes that form the focus of this Article, a whole range of
federal land use statutes can be described by reference to this set of design
choices. For one well-known example, consider the provision of the FHA
that forbids localities from “mak[ing] unavailable” housing to persons on
the basis of race and other criteria.137 This provision, the Supreme Court
recently confirmed, imposes disparate impact liability on localities.138 It
thus takes the form of a decision-displacing rule: like RLUIPA, it carves
out a set of outcomes—those that make housing unavailable to persons on
the basis of particular criteria—and deems those outcomes unlawful.139
And it is imposed by fiat because it takes the form of a command that
aggrieved parties can wield in court to seek relief from noncompliant
localities. To take another example, the Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act of 1991 requires states and localities, as a condition on
receipt of federal highway funds, to engage in particular forms of longrange land use planning.140 It does not prescribe or forbid specific outcomes
like a decision-displacing rule does; instead, it channels land use
decisionmaking by requiring certain analyses and thought processes. And
because the scheme is linked to the receipt of federal funding, adoption of
the channeling constraint is incentivized by federal law.141
One could go on. But the key takeaway at this juncture is that the array
of nationalizing land use statutes on the books is in fact quite diverse with
respect to these three important legislative design choices.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012).
138. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507
(2015).
139. If this provision only contemplated disparate treatment liability—in other words, if it meant
only that localities cannot take actions for which race or other protected statuses are a reason for the
action—then it would be more similar to the previously discussed provision of the TCA that prohibits
localities from relying on a particular basis for its decision while refraining from forbidding any
particular decision. See supra note 117.
140. See 23 U.S.C. § 134(i) (2012); Ostrow, Land Law, supra note 1, at 1427.
141. A boundary case is the Clean Air Act, which conditions the receipt of federal highway
funding on the development of pollution-control plans. 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c) (2012). The Act does not
explicitly demand or prohibit a particular plan, which suggests it is non-displacing. (The only choice it
arguably displaces is the choice not to have a pollution-control plan at all, which is akin to the TCA’s
weak “displacement” of a locality’s choice to prohibit all cell towers. See supra note 117.) Instead, it
sets out a series of things that must be considered and included in the development of a plan. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410. That approach suggests a decision-channeling mechanism. Coupled with the conditional
spending hook, the Act thus appears to be another example of an incentive-based channeling
nationalization. However, the elements that plans are required to contain leave relatively little room for
discretion. For example, each plan must “require, as may be prescribed by the [EPA] Administrator,”
the installation of equipment and periodic reports by certain polluters, and the “correlation” of such
reports by state agencies. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(F). Further, the various requirements of the broader statutory
scheme interact to further limit the scope of discretion. While formally channeling, then, provisions like
this one come close to displacing. And they do so by incentive—a combination not yet encountered in
this Article.
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III. ACCOUNTING FOR LOCAL DEMOCRATIC COST
This Part assesses the implications for local democracy of the
legislative design choices set out above. But rather than begin with the
motives for nationalization, it focuses on the two mechanism choices—
displacement versus channeling, and fiat versus incentive—because, as will
become clear below, that is where most of the variation lies. However, as
Part IV explores, the motives are relevant to determining whether and when
the local democratic costs of a particular mechanism should counsel against
its use.
A. Displacement and Channeling
The first of the two mechanism dimensions, and perhaps the most
salient, is Congress’s choice whether to nationalize land use law through
imposition of a decision-displacing rule like RLUIPA, or a decisionchanneling rule like the TCA. Analysis of both of these statutes reveals that
displacement biases local decisionmaking significantly more than
channeling does. In fact, the channeling mechanism offers substantial gains
for local participatory democracy.
Take decision-displacing rules first. These are rules that set certain
outcomes off limits for localities. Recall that RLUIPA, for example,
provides that “[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use
regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution,” unless
imposing the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest and
represents the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.142 Put
another way, RLUIPA’s displacing rule lifts certain land use questions—
those in which one or more of the possible outcomes might impose a
substantial burden on religious exercise without a compelling justification
or by way of means more restrictive than necessary—out of the local
decisionmaking process and resolves them in favor of a particular class of
land users.143
Moreover, because local land use boards are “extremely vulnerable to
the threat of litigation” and are “worr[ied] about the time, expense, and
social cost of litigating against” well-funded or well-respected landowners,

142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2012).
143. See Schragger, supra note 4, at 1844, 1846 (expressing skepticism about RLUIPA because
it “take[s] an entire category of activity . . . out of the hands of local regulatory authorities” and because
it “impos[es] a norm of religious favoritism regardless of the specifics of any particular community”).
Even if RLUIPA instead imposed a lower level of scrutiny, the same qualitative description would be
appropriate, although the set of off-limits outcomes would be smaller.

3 POLLACK - LAND USE - 707-758 (DO NOT DELETE)

738

Alabama Law Review

4/10/2017 1:24 PM

[Vol. 68:3:707

they are likely to err against violating a displacing rule.144 The result is at
least some overprotection of the land use singled out by federal law. The
degree of acquiescence to the nationally protected land use will almost
certainly vary with both the haziness of the law’s boundaries and the
difficulties of demonstrating that they have not been transgressed. But in
the RLUIPA context, for example, the opacity of what precisely constitutes
a substantial burden,145 and the difficulty of satisfying the requirement that
a substantial burden serve a compelling government interest with the least
restrictive means,146 make likely a relatively high degree of
overprotection.147
Regardless of the precise size of the set of land use questions for which
local governments understand their decisions to have been displaced, this
kind of local acquiescence is fundamentally at odds with democratic
responsiveness. A decisionmaking process that results in the repeated
acquiescence to the demands of a particular type of claimant is one that is
systemically biased in favor of that claimant class. Such bias is problematic
whether the class represents a majority or minority interest in the locality.
Either way, a particular group has been singled out and told that it need not
“pull, haul, and trade” to get what it wants from its local government.148
Moreover, such bias is problematic whether or not the individual members
of the local government would have, in a particular case, reached the same
conclusion had their decision not been displaced by federal law. Either
way, the decisionmaking process has been biased by both the direct and in
terrorem effects of the national decision-displacing rule. Finally, the
embedded bias means that local government is less able to effectively
respond to the informational inputs of the community. Rather than promote
stakeholders’ ability to share information that aids informed
decisionmaking, and rather than amplify local government’s ability to act
144. Sara C. Galvan, Note, Beyond Worship: The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 and Religious Institutions’ Auxiliary Uses, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 207, 231
(2006).
145. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775–76 (2014) (concluding that
a substantial burden existed under RFRA where the obligations of the law conflicted with the plaintiffs’
religious beliefs and where disobedience carried substantial “economic consequences”). While future
RFRA litigation may shed light on that test, see supra note 102, it remains to be seen whether it will
clarify the opacity in a way that offers comfort or even greater risk for localities.
146. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780 (noting that “[t]he least-restrictive-means standard is
exceptionally demanding”).
147. See Salkin, supra note 10, at 293 (“The threat of RLUIPA litigation and the costs that it
entails . . . give local governments a strong disincentive to impose limitations on development projects
proposed by religious groups, even where they might conflict with long term plans and legitimate
community concerns.”); Salkin & Lavine, supra note 18, at 255–56; Galvan, supra note 144, at 231–32.
148. Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994). As Richard Schragger has pointed out,
RLUIPA thus “prevents the local negotiation of the religious–secular relationship,” which may have the
added pernicious effect of “engender[ing] hostility toward religion in general or spark[ing] specific
sectarian animosities.” Schragger, supra note 4, at 1847–48.

3 POLLACK - LAND USE - 707-758 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

Land Use Federalism’s False Choice

4/10/2017 1:24 PM

739

based on that information, a decision-displacing rule is blind to community
knowledge and substantially limits the locality’s ability to make contextappropriate decisions in light of such knowledge.
Not only do decision-displacing nationalizations like RLUIPA fare
poorly in terms of responsiveness, their failure creates the very problems
for citizens’ relationships with local government discussed in Part I.A.
Whether viewed from the perspective of homeowners without an exit
option, governments interested in instilling compliance with the law, or
Americans with an intrinsic desire to be heard, displacing nationalizations
like RLUIPA impose significant costs on local democracy because the
structural biases they create shut down the access points and opportunities
for robust participation that people expect and value. When federal law
eliminates potential land use outcomes or even demands particular
outcomes,
residents
understandably
feel
they
have
been
“disenfranchise[d].”149
Indeed, in at least some sense, residents have been locally
disenfranchised: the decision maker under a displacing law like RLUIPA is
effectively the national government and not the local government. Insofar
as laws like RLUIPA require localities to reach results that some or even
many residents would have otherwise sought to shape or even oppose,
those residents are unable to hold their own local governments accountable
in any meaningful way. After all, even if they exercise their prerogative to
punish local decision makers by replacing them with other people, the
replacements will be bound all the same by the displacing constraint.
RLUIPA and its ilk thus short-circuit the most basic form of accountability
in local government. It is no wonder people feel as if they have been
silenced: they are unable to transform opposition to land use decisions into
effective voice in the moment, or into retrospective electoral discipline.150
That sense of voicelessness can be expected to spill over into a whole
range of other problems. Some include the potential for reduced respect for

149. Gunther, supra note 19; see Durchslag, supra note 38, at 492 (“[O]ne can hardly imagine a
greater disincentive to political engagement at the local level . . . than severely circumscribing its major
policy making role, controlling its physical and environmental amenities.”).
150. The saga of the attempt by the government of the City of Yonkers to comply with a federal
court order requiring the desegregation of public housing in that city in the late 1980s, recently and
faithfully depicted in the HBO miniseries Show Me a Hero and the book on which it was based, is all
too illustrative. See generally LISA BELKIN, SHOW ME A HERO: A TALE OF MURDER, SUICIDE, RACE,
AND REDEMPTION (1999); Show Me a Hero (HBO Miniseries 2015). In the face of overwhelming
public opposition on the one hand, and ruinous court-imposed penalties on the other, the city
government tried to satisfy its federal obligations and quell local resistance by pointing the finger at
federal authorities. It did not work. Perceiving that they were not being listened to by their local
government, residents twice lashed out and exercised their electoral voice to replace the mayor and
members of the city council, only to find twice that the new government was equally bound by federal
law. Tensions and resentment lingered for years.
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and compliance with other decisions of the governing body.151 For
example, outrage about acquiescence to nationally favored land uses might
well lead other landowners to be uncooperative with local authorities with
respect to modifications they might wish to make to their own properties.
This is so regardless of whether those landowners know that federal law
and not local government is really to blame.152 Given the research
discussed above, one ought to expect at least some degree of “If the church/
factory/etc. can do whatever it wants, why shouldn’t I?” action on the part
of other landowners.153 Other consequences might include financial costs.
Because homeowners value effective voice, as noted above, one would
expect that homes in a municipality with a relatively high frequency of
nationally protected land uses—and therefore a relatively high frequency of
acquiescence—will be less attractive to the average buyer and will
therefore lose more value, all else equal, than homes in a municipality
relatively unburdened by the use that federal law has favored.154
Finally, the welfare costs that attend feelings of powerlessness and
“disaffection with the entire political process” must not be ignored.155
Losing is never fun, but where a person perceives that she has suffered
“systematic depredations” in a process that she “has little opportunity to
influence” or in which she feels unrepresented, those losses are particularly
acute.156 And where those losses occur with respect to decisions that affect
property, the financial and emotional investments that people have made in
their property mean that the losses sting that much more.
The fact that RLUIPA is a powerful tool for religious land uses is by no
means a revelation. Nor is it revelatory that the results of that powerful tool
may come at the expense of neighbors and other land users. In fact, this is

151. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
152. Indeed, even if the landowner knows that federal law is to blame to some degree, see Siegel,
supra note 25, at 1632, he or she may believe that local government is not doing enough to resist, or is
not pushing the envelope sufficiently to test the limitations of federal law, and may therefore perceive
local government to be the more immediate cause of unfairness. The Yonkers public housing crisis is
again illustrative. See supra note 150. Moreover, the resident may even be correct about the allocation
of blame, given that local authorities may exploit the cover offered to them by federal law to make more
decisions they might not otherwise be able to justify to their constituents.
153. See supra note 51.
154. See supra notes 31–50 and accompanying text.
155. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 60, at 150.
156. Rose, supra note 37, at 1126; see FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 60, at 165
(“[T]here is a special demoralization cost that attaches to lack of representation in the political
process.”); Durchslag, supra note 38, at 486 (describing costs stemming from the sense “that those
regulated have little leverage to influence the political system in their favor in the future”). This point
about the importance a property owner attaches to the process by which his property or his neighbors’
property is regulated borrows from Frank Michelman’s observation about “demoralization costs” in the
context of government takings made without the assurance of compensation. See Frank I. Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law,
80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214–15 (1967).
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what Congress desired.157 But the problem for local democracy is not that
Congress gave religious landowners “a special right to challenge land use
laws,” even though that has been a primary objection leveled by many
critics of RLUIPA.158 That charge misses the mark almost entirely. Instead,
the problem is that Congress chose a particular type of powerful tool. Local
acquiescence, and the costs and consequences of that acquiescence, are
attributable to RLUIPA’s displacing nature, not to the mere existence of its
special protection.
Perhaps the best way to demonstrate that diagnosis is to compare the
responsiveness effects of a displacing rule like RLUIPA to those of a
statute that offers special protection to a particular land use in a channeling
fashion. As discussed above, the TCA is one such statute: it gives
telecommunications companies a special right to challenge land use
decisions, but it does so in a markedly different way. And it does so with
notably different consequences.
In contrast to RLUIPA’s displacing mechanism, the TCA’s channeling
mechanism does not declare any outcomes off limits.159 Instead, the
constraint it imposes is a reason-giving one. Whereas RLUIPA provides
that a land use decision that imposes a substantial burden on religious
exercise without serving a compelling governmental interest by the least
restrictive means is off limits no matter the amount of explanation or
“substantial evidence” the locality can give, the TCA permits a locality to
make whatever decision it wishes so long as it can explain itself in writing
with reasons supported by “substantial evidence.” Simply put, where a
displacing nationalization takes a set of decisions away from localities, a
channeling nationalization leaves the full set of decisions to local

157. Whether that policy choice was a wise, necessary, or constitutional one is beyond the scope
of this Article, though some have claimed that it is none of those things. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note
8, at 344–51; Salkin & Lavine, supra note 18, at 256; Stephen Clowney, Comment, An Empirical Look
at Churches in the Zoning Process, 116 YALE L.J. 859 (2007). But see, e.g., Douglas Laycock, State
RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 755, 783 (1999).
158. Marci Hamilton, The Federal Government’s Intervention on Behalf of Religious Entities in
Local Land Use Disputes: Why It’s a Terrible Idea, FINDLAW (Nov. 6, 2003),
http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/hamilton/20031106.html; see HAMILTON, supra note 86, at 94, 106
(RLUIPA offers “preferential treatment” for religious landowners and “alters the balance” between
properties); Bray, supra note 18, at 43 (RLUIPA “provides religious landowners with special
protections”); Sager, supra note 18, at 14 (decrying RLUIPA’s “remarkable privileging of the land use
interests of churches over all but the most weighty of land use concerns”); Salkin & Lavine, supra note
18, at 255 (RLUIPA “provid[es] religious groups with an unfair advantage”).
159. The TCA does also provide that a locality may not discriminate among providers and may
not effectively prohibit outright the availability of cell service, see 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i) (2012);
supra note 117, but that is a far cry from prescribing outcomes in individual cases. The TCA also
declares one rationale off limits: a locality may not make siting decisions on the basis of alleged
environmental effects of cell tower radio frequency emissions so long as the towers comply with FCC
regulations on the topic. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv); supra note 117. But the locality remains free
to reach any decision it wishes so long as it can point to any other rationale.
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decisionmaking so long as the localities take specified steps as they
deliberate.
In this way, decision-channeling rules are far less costly in terms of
democratic responsiveness than are decision-displacing rules. First, nothing
in a channeling rule like the TCA demands repeated acquiescence to a
particular type of claimant or a particular class of requests—either by
placing particular outcomes off limits or by operating upon localities’ risk
aversion.160 It thus does not inject systemic decisionmaking bias. Second,
such statutes do not alleviate any class of claimant from the obligation to
bargain, to give and take, and to participate in the same local fora as all
other land users. Consider the background of the T-Mobile case discussed
above. After reviewing T-Mobile’s application, the city’s zoning board
recommended that the city council require T-Mobile to move the planned
cell tower to mitigate its aesthetic impact, to build a fence around the
tower, and to plant thirty-three evergreen trees around the tower.161
Perceiving these conditions to be the cost of approval, T-Mobile was
prepared to agree to all of them, and offered a presentation at a two-hour
public hearing at which it engaged with and responded to concerns raised
by members of the community.162 A land user protected by a decisiondisplacing nationalization like RLUIPA, by contrast, would have only the
weakest of incentives to engage in this kind of back-and-forth because the
displacing statute operates as a trump. A decision-channeling
nationalization like the TCA offers no such trump. Finally, and very much
related, channeling nationalizations permit local government to gather and
respond to community knowledge. In fact, they actively foster such
informed decisionmaking.
By faring better for local democracy than displacing nationalizations,
channeling nationalizations avoid negative impacts on citizens’
relationships with local government. Because statutes like the TCA
disenfranchise no one, there is no reason for citizens to feel like they have
not been heard, even when a cell tower they oppose ultimately gets built.
There is accordingly little reason to fear that property values will reflect a
perception of ineffective voice,163 and little reason to worry that citizens
160. See Ostrow, Process Preemption, supra note 8, at 293 (noting that the TCA operates on “the
siting process, without disempowering local governments” (emphasis omitted)).
161. T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 731 F.3d 1213, 1215 (11th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S.
Ct. 808 (2015).
162. See T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808, 812 (2015); T-Mobile, 731 F.3d at
1215–16. The first condition was, however, one to which the proposed tower’s neighbor was not
prepared to agree. See id. at 1215 n.1.
163. Of course, if the existence of too many cell phone towers in a particular locality is viewed
negatively, the fact of the towers itself may cause a decrease in property values. But that is a different
sort of cost: one that is attributable to the decision made by the locality, not to the way in which the
decision was made. And, perhaps more important, it is a cost for which residents can effectively punish
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will feel entitled to be uncooperative: they can expect the same less-thancertain probability of success within the give-and-take of the zoning
process as the telecommunications company can. Finally, because these
statutes do not introduce systemic bias, they achieve their ends without
imposing the welfare costs that attend depredations the landowner
perceives he “has little opportunity to influence.”164
It gets even better. Federally imposed channeling constraints like the
TCA may actually result in broader responsiveness improvements for
localities. First, channeling constraints reduce the impact of biases—both
personal and structural—that may already be in the system. This is a
familiar concept in administrative law: the process of gathering
information, considering evidence, and giving articulable reasons produces
more careful and fair decisionmaking.165 As the D.C. Circuit once put it,
reason-giving requirements result in “reflective findings, in furtherance of
even-handed application of law, rather than impermissible whim, improper
influence, or misplaced zeal.”166 Cognitive and social psychology research
concurs that “one of the best mechanisms” for improving decisionmaking
“is forcing oneself to consider alternatives and [to] carefully review

the local government because the responsibility is plainly allocated to the local government itself. No
external rule forces any locality to approve “too many,” or any number of, towers. If a local government
does so, it has either acted contrary to the wishes of its constituents or has failed to accurately perceive
the constraint imposed on it by federal law—sins for which it should suffer ordinary electoral
consequences in a functioning system of accountability. In short, whereas displacing nationalizations
like RLUIPA short-circuit local accountability by seizing decisions and making it impossible for
residents to directly punish the relevant decisionmakers, with all the consequences that disjunction
entails, see supra notes 149–156 and accompanying text, channeling nationalizations like the TCA
leave the system of local accountability in place.
164. Rose, supra note 37, at 1126.
165. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson & Ethan J. Leib, Regleprudence—At OIRA and Beyond, 103
GEO. L.J. 259, 303 (2015); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based
Environmental Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1184, 1233 (2014) (noting that reason-giving limits
discretion, promotes transparency, legitimates “the exercise of administrative discretion,” and
“improv[es] the quality of agency decisionmaking directly . . . by forcing agencies to examine issues
they might otherwise ignore”); Rose, supra note 1, at 899–900 (noting that a reason-giving requirement
“encourages an exploration of issues and potential accommodations”); Frederick Schauer, Giving
Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 657–58 (1995) (noting that “reason-giving mandate[s] . . . drive out
illegitimate reasons when they are the only plausible explanation for particular outcomes”); Jodi L.
Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE
L.J. 1811, 1813 (2012) (explaining that scholars and courts “theorize the practice of reason giving as
central to constraining and legitimating administrative agencies” because the practice advances
“rationality”); Glen Staszewski; Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1280–81
(2009) (noting that reason-giving limits the scope of discretion and ensures that “relatively selfish
policy options [are] discarded in favor of more public-spirited alternatives”); Cass R. Sunstein,
Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1091 (2000) (explaining the ways in
which “judgments may change as a result of reason giving in the public domain”). Professor Ostrow has
explicitly linked this observation to the context of the TCA. See Ostrow, Process Preemption, supra
note 8, at 292–93, 299–300, 319–20 (explaining that the TCA’s requirements compel local governments
to consider wider interests).
166. Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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arguments against one’s position.”167 Engaging in these sorts of
metacognitive actions not only reduces the impact of whim or improper
influence but also reduces the negative side effects of overconfidence and
the common but erroneous belief that one sees things just like everyone
else does.168 Similarly, the management and organizational learning
literature recognizes that, when decision makers are required to engage in
regularized information collection and are forced to demonstrate that they
have confronted and learned from information they might not otherwise
have known of or considered, the result is that “the biasing effects of
preexisting knowledge structures” and preexisting assumptions are
“mediate[d].”169
Across contexts, then, scholars and judges agree that regularizing
openness to stakeholder input and demanding reason-giving accountability
can debias decisionmaking.170 That is a valuable goal in and of itself,171 but
these kinds of deliberative requirements can go a step further by changing
the community’s relationship with local government. For all the reasons
discussed above, the more that a locality’s decisionmaking provides a
forum for the effective exercise of voice, the more faith the public will
have in local government and in the outcomes it generates, and the more
compliance and satisfaction should be expected.172 This increase in faith,
167. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government
Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 588 (2002); see id. at 610–11 (explaining that, because decisional
biases are often features of human cognition rather than intentional prejudices, they can be minimized
by the “public vetting and explanation” that comes with information-gathering and reason-giving).
168. Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 496–99 (2002).
169. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and
Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 441–42 (2006).
170. See Ostrow, Process Preemption, supra note 8, at 330 (arguing that the TCA’s reasongiving requirement leads zoning boards “to exercise principled discretion” and “promotes more
deliberative and rational decisionmaking”).
171. Indeed, scholars and an ABA task force studying local land use decisionmaking have
endeavored to move local government toward more responsiveness with channeling reforms. See id. at
326 & nn.253–54 (collecting sources).
172. As Judge Henry Friendly once said, “A statement of reasons may even make a decision
somewhat more acceptable to a losing claimant.” Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing”, 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 1267, 1292 (1975); see Mantel, supra note 51, at 377–79 (noting that perceived fairness of
processes translates into perceived fairness of government generally); Rose, supra note 1, at 900 (noting
particularly in land use context that “explanation ultimately helps to reconcile the parties” and that
losers “may be at least partially mollified if they know the reasons” for the decision). The broader point
about increased public trust and accountability pervades the literature. See, e.g., Greater Bos. Television
Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (explaining that reasoned decisionmaking “furthers
the broad public interest of enabling the public to repose confidence in the process as well as the
judgments of its decision-makers”); Donald J. Kochan, Constituencies and Contemporaneousness in
Reason-Giving: Thoughts and Direction After T-Mobile, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 30–34 (2015) (noting
that reason-giving promotes rule-of-law values, increases governmental legitimacy, promotes public
participation, and enables accountability); Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European
Union, the United States, and the Project of Democratic Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 111
(2007) (explaining that reason-giving “increases the power of participants” in decisionmaking and thus

3 POLLACK - LAND USE - 707-758 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

Land Use Federalism’s False Choice

4/10/2017 1:24 PM

745

and in the perception that local government can be a place where members
of the community are heard and responded to, can in turn generate more
engagement by the public—which can further enhance decisionmaking and
further improve public perceptions of government. In this way, channeling
nationalizations and reason-giving requirements can set off virtuous circles
of self-reinforcing enhancements in participation and responsiveness.
Moreover, as localities adapt to decisionmaking practices in a particular
context—say, cell tower siting—those practices may start to be understood
as generally applicable norms of good government. And as decision makers
regularize openness, learning, and reason-giving, they may find it efficient
or otherwise beneficial to engage in those same practices and begin
similarly virtuous circles even when not expressly required by federal
law.173
Not only can federal decision-channeling requirements cause these
valuable spillover effects, but they may also often be the only politically
feasible or normatively desirable action that can. As for feasibility, it is
hard to imagine the federal government agreeing on, or even
understanding, all the details necessary to enact a sweeping “Improve Local
Democracy Now” statute that would shape local decisionmaking across the
board. And as for normative concerns, it is also not at all clear that such a
statute would be a good idea, as it would stifle process-based innovation
and variation at the local level. But by taking channeling-based action in
the context of particular subjects of national interest—like the
telecommunications grid—Congress can spur reform at the local level and
set off a chain reaction that, while likely taking different paths in different
localities, may build towards improvements in local responsiveness and
accountability.
Even setting aside these benefits, channeling nationalizations like the
TCA impose lower costs on democratic responsiveness than displacing
nationalizations like RLUIPA, and they do so while still achieving their
ends.174 The number of cell phone towers has “increased exponentially”
since 1996.175 According to one industry source, there were 30,045 cell

“reinforces participatory rights”); Short, supra note 165, at 1861, 1871 (explaining that reason-giving
“create[s] social relationships and organizational structures that tend to channel the exercise of agency
discretion within politically and socially acceptable parameters,” “facilitat[es] cooperation and
collective action[,]” and “justif[ies] the outcomes . . . in widely acceptable terms”); Staszewski, supra
note 165, at 1278, 1282–84 (explaining how reason-giving promotes legitimacy and “deliberative
accountability”).
173. See Michael C. Pollack, Judicial Deference and Institutional Character: Homeowners
Associations and the Puzzle of Private Governance, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 839, 890 (2013) (emphasizing
that reason-giving can become habit).
174. See Ostrow, Process Preemption, supra note 8, at 293 (noting that the TCA “has succeeded
in achieving its federal land use goals”).
175. Ostrow, Land Law, supra note 1, at 1420.
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sites in the country when the TCA was enacted in 1996; by 2013, there
were 304,360.176 To be sure, this growth is not attributable solely to the
TCA. As cell phone usage expanded, some residents presumably started to
attach some nonzero value to adequate cell coverage and accordingly
weakened or abandoned their opposition. But this preference-shifting
account of the TCA’s success is incomplete. First, it is questionable
whether coverage would have expanded sufficiently to get that change in
preferences started without the TCA. Second, a person who sees a cell
phone tower from his back porch every day is unlikely to consider the
value of cell coverage to be worth the aesthetic costs and the diminished
property value.
Instead, courts have recognized that the most important effect of the
TCA is that the hoops it imposed prompted localities to think more
critically about why they were denying siting applications.177 Specifically,
the TCA demanded that localities hear telecommunications companies out,
and in the process prompted localities to critically evaluate preconceptions,
costs, and benefits in ways consistent with the psychological research
discussed above. When required to rationalize their decisions based on
evidence, localities reached conclusions consistent with the aims of federal
law—and they did so all on their own, without the responsivenesseliminating hand of displacing nationalization.178
One might protest that the difference I observe here is due simply to
the specific reaches of the two statutes, not to their mechanisms. In other
words, one might say that RLUIPA is simply a more intrusive law, full
stop, than is the TCA because the special right that RLUIPA affords its
176. Background on CTIA’s Wireless Industry Survey, supra note 75, at 2.
177. See, e.g., T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cty., 546 F.3d 1299, 1306
(10th Cir. 2008) (attributing TCA’s success to “reducing the impediments that local governments could
impose to defeat or delay the installation of wireless communications facilities such as cell phone
towers, and by protecting against ‘irrational or substanceless decisions by local authorities’” (first citing
City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 115 (2005); then quoting Sw. Bell Mobile Sys.
v. Todd, 244 F.3d 51, 57 (1st Cir. 2001))).
178. I acknowledge that the fact that the TCA’s channeling requirement only attaches to denials
and not grants, see 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (2012), might suggest that this expansion of cell
coverage is merely the result of local governments rolling over at the expense of their citizens to avoid
the obligations of justifying their decisions with reasons. But this is unlikely for two reasons. First,
unlike with RLUIPA, local decision makers are unable to shift blame to a federal decision-displacing
rule. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. None exists. So if local decision makers are granting
undesirable cell tower applications simply to avoid reason-giving requirements, one would expect them
to suffer electoral consequences—or to be disciplined ex ante by the prospect of electoral consequences.
Second, those decision makers have their own non-electoral incentives to consider. They live in their
communities and should therefore be expected to avoid granting applications that may harm their own
property values. Indeed, the underprovision of cell tower sites prior to the enactment of the TCA
discussed above, see supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text, was likely attributable to some
combination of these two forces. It defies belief to suggest that these powerful electoral and financial
incentives could be outweighed by the benefit of not having to come up with a coherent reason for a
denial decision.
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preferred class of claimant is broader or weightier than the special right that
the TCA affords its preferred class. That is unlikely the causal story for a
few reasons. First, as discussed above, the TCA is really quite intrusive in
its own right: it entitles a particular set of claimants to demand a far more
elaborate hearing than other claimants are entitled to and it holds local
governments to a more demanding denial standard with respect to those
privileged claimants.179 Second, that explanation would ignore what the
administrative law principles and the cognitive and behavioral research
discussed above have revealed about group decisionmaking for decades,
namely that deliberative processes matter.180 Contending that the difference
in RLUIPA and the TCA’s responsiveness costs has nothing to do with the
differences in their deliberative mechanisms is at odds with these
foundational ideas.
Still, it is fair to object that the reach of the TCA in particular may
leave localities with more room to maneuver than does the reach of
RLUIPA, which may make these responses less than completely satisfying
on their own. But a thought experiment with a hypothetical channeling
RLUIPA that has a reach equal to or greater than the RLUIPA that exists
today demonstrates that the degree of bias caused by RLUIPA is more
attributable to its mechanism than to its reach.
Imagine that instead of the RLUIPA we have, Congress provided that a
locality must convene a special Board of Religious Land Use Oversight to
review the decisions of the ordinary zoning board, not only with respect to
the land use denials that impose “substantial burdens” on religious exercise
but also with respect to land use denials that impose any burden on
religious exercise.181 Imagine further that this Board would consist of
community faith leaders selected by the local government across faiths for
fixed terms.182 And to make the federally required procedure really quite
intrusive, this Board would have the unchecked authority to reverse by
simple majority a denial decision from the regular zoning board with
respect to religious land use requests. Everyone else would be stuck with
the denials handed down by the regular authorities. This Board would,

179. Again, some have argued that the TCA violates the Tenth Amendment. See supra note 106
and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 165–173.
181. To return to the simplified hypothetical from the Introduction, this channeling RLUIPA is
equivalent to a federal law that would instruct localities to take certain deliberative steps before
approving houses colored blue and purple. See supra page 713. The RLUIPA we have is equivalent to a
federal law that instructs localities not to approve any blue houses.
182. I am not suggesting that faith leaders will necessarily be consciously biased in favor of
religious land users, but rather that they can be expected to be relatively less unconsciously biased
against religious land users, given their knowledge of those land users’ needs. The same effect can be
achieved with lay members that, through experience on the Board, develop similar knowledge that may
mitigate unconscious biases they may have once held.
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however, be bound by channeling rules similar to those set out in the
TCA.183 It would be required by federal law to hold hearings open to public
participation and to make decisions within a reasonable timeframe. It
would also be required to issue written decisions with reasons that are
rooted in substantial evidence contained in a written record and that are
made available “essentially contemporaneously” with the written denial.184
And any person adversely affected by the Board’s decision would be
permitted to commence within thirty days an expedited lawsuit in federal
court.
Setting aside any Establishment Clause or other constitutional concerns
about this particular Board,185 the differential impact on local
responsiveness as compared to the RLUIPA we have today is apparent.
This decision-channeling framework would be even more far-reaching than
RLUIPA because it would be triggered by land use denials that impose any
burden on religious exercise, not just by those that impose substantial
burdens. And yet, it would inject less systemic bias than would a decisiondisplacing nationalization. Rather than demand acquiescence to a particular
class of claimant, this channeling rule would keep the locus of
decisionmaking centered in the community and would create a site of
community engagement and potential negotiation.186 By creating a space
for bargaining and accommodation that would bring more stakeholders to
the table—or at least invite them to it—such a channeling rule could foster
more nuanced, context-appropriate, and mutually beneficial outcomes than
would a displacing rule, for all the reasons discussed above.
Moreover, even if the possibility of changed outcomes were very small,
this shift would remain of central importance. While the channeling rule
would still privilege a class of claimant, it would do so by fostering a local
forum in which members of the community could be heard and in which
the privileged land users would be obligated to make their cases and
respond to concerns. In addition, the fact that the Board would need to be
able to offer reasons backed by substantial evidence in a record would have
a similar information-forcing effect. As a result of both, all interested
183. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii)–(iii), (v); supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text.
184. T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808, 812 (2015).
185. After all, some have argued that RLUIPA already violates the Establishment Clause. See,
e.g., Schragger, supra note 4, at 1846–47 (arguing that RLUIPA’s “sheer breadth” “raises significant
Establishment Clause concerns”). But see Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (upholding the
institutionalized persons portion of RLUIPA against a facial Establishment Clause challenge). That
question is beyond the scope of this Article. This particular Board might also raise potential Tenth
Amendment concerns or might even run afoul of some state laws. I bracket these concerns as well in
this stylized example in order to focus on the channeling mechanism’s distinct implications for local
democracy.
186. Cf. Schragger, supra note 4, at 1848 (criticizing RLUIPA because it “prevents the local
negotiation of the religious–secular relationship, closing off the option for local communities to deal
with religious conflict collectively and where it is likely taking place”).
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parties would perceive that their views and information mattered and would
develop better understandings of each other’s needs and preferences.
Moreover, the Board would be accountable to the voices of all citizens
through both the elected officials who appoint the Board members and the
Board’s own reason-giving obligations—obligations that would be
enforced by substantial evidence review in federal court. For these reasons,
regardless of the frequency with which the Board might reach any
particular outcome, we could expect to see more compliance, less damage
to property values, and more satisfaction with local government.187
To be sure, whether because of its scope or its character, or both, this
channeling RLUIPA might fail to harness some of the spillover benefits
discussed above. It might even interfere with local responsiveness more
than the TCA does, and its substantive reach might be troubling as a matter
of policy for a number of reasons. But one could say the same about the
RLUIPA we have. Instead, the important points are, first, that it would
interfere with local responsiveness less than RLUIPA’s displacing
nationalization, and second, that it would hold out the prospect of
triggering improvements in the functioning of local democracy.
B. Fiat and Incentive
The second of the two mechanism dimensions is Congress’s choice
whether to implement a displacing or channeling restriction by fiat, as with
RLUIPA and the TCA, or by incentive, as with spending programs like the
CZMA or TEA-21. For reasons similar to those discussed with respect to
why channeling biases local decisionmaking less than displacing does,
incentives impose less bias than fiat does. Moreover, incentives can even
enhance local participatory democracy.
First, offers of money in exchange for the adoption of federally
preferred outcomes or decisionmaking processes do not dictate the
adoption of either. Instead, the choice to adopt either one is left in the
hands of the locality, and that is a choice about which people can make
their various interests and views heard within whatever local democratic

187. One could imagine a similar revision of the decision-displacing FHA provision that
prohibits land use decisions that have the effect of making housing unavailable on the basis of race or
other protected criteria. See supra notes 137–139 and accompanying text. Instead, a federal statute
might require localities to convene Boards of Fair Housing that would give the same protected classes
special rights to access appellate procedures that require open hearings and written reasons supported
by substantial evidence, all backed by review in federal court. As with RLUIPA, such a shift would
offer greater protection to local democracy and might even enhance it. How to tell whether that
preservation of local democracy might come at too great a cost to other values is explored in Part IV,
infra.
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access points exist in the community.188 This desire to “direct
development” in ways that minimize environmental harm while avoiding
“federal displacement of local choices”189 was, for example, part of why
Congress chose the CZMA’s incentive mechanism. Moreover, by putting a
concrete price on the decision, the very offer of federal money has the
potential to catalyze or make more salient a local dialogue on the relevant
land use issue. It may thus increase the level of democratic engagement
surrounding that issue.190
Of course, this is not to say that the access points to participate in those
local choices are always robust. If they are, then a noncoercive offer of
federal money will tap into that local democracy and might make the
community even more engaged with it. But if local democracy is otherwise
closed to meaningful participation, the ability to choose whether to accept
or reject the federal condition is unlikely to dramatically change those
circumstances. In this way, conditional nationalization is, at worst, neutral
in its effect on local democracy. Fiat nationalization, by contrast, has a far
more damaging worst-case scenario. While it might improve local
responsiveness if it takes the form of a channeling nationalization, it will
actively harm local responsiveness if it takes the form of a displacing
nationalization. Conditional nationalization, at a minimum, avoids these
potential costs.
Second, conditional spending programs generally entail federal review
of local activities to ensure that the federal money is being used in a
manner consistent with the federal goal and with any other federal
conditions. This sort of oversight serves a version of the role that reasongiving requirements can serve. As discussed above in the context of
channeling nationalizations, such requirements improve decisionmaking by
debiasing it and by forcing more metacognitive reflection.191 Similarly,
routine oversight “creates incentives for state and local officials to consider
repercussions of their actions that might otherwise be neglected,” “deters
sloppy work,” and “reduces the risk of corrupt or patronage-driven
development projects.”192 Where the condition is the adoption of a federal
188. See Buzbee, supra note 1, at 108–09 (“[S]tate and local governments remain the primary
decisionmakers regarding land use . . . . All conditional federal spending schemes leave state and local
governments with greater locally sensitive discretion than would be the case with direct federal
intervention.”); Ostrow, Land Law, supra note 1, at 1427 (“[W]hile conditional spending seeks to guide
state and local decision making, the decision-making authority itself remains in the hands of local
regulators.”).
189. Buzbee, supra note 1, at 111.
190. See id. at 121 (noting that federal dollars that come with a targeted purpose “provoke
greater local political participation,” especially if they come with participation requirements).
191. See supra notes 165–173.
192. Buzbee, supra note 1, at 108; see id. at 114 (noting that conditional federal spending can
“serve to encourage more open state, regional, and local planning processes” and can “modify[] what
might otherwise be insulated or uninformed decisionmaking”).
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decision, incentive-based implementation can thus buy some of the benefits
of channeling even while taking the form of a displacing rule. Where the
condition is itself about the manner in which subsequent decisions are
reached, incentives can double down on those benefits.
Finally, while there is certainly a risk that the federal government’s
offer goes unaccepted—a concern that does not accompany fiat
nationalization—conditional spending can nonetheless be an effective form
of nationalization in the land use context.193 For example, in the case of the
CZMA, states have “responded enthusiastically, welcoming both federal
support and national recognition of the need for comprehensive coastal
management.”194 Thirty-four out of thirty-five eligible states and territories
participate in the CZMA and now have federally approved coastal
management plans, along with the grant money that accompanies them.195
Adapting the fiat nationalizations discussed in this Article into
incentive-based efforts would, aside from requiring the federal government
to spend money, be relatively easy to imagine. The TCA’s channeling
mechanism is already quite good for local democracy, but one could
imagine instead incentivizing the same decisionmaking architecture much
in the way that the CZMA does—namely with an offer of funding to
support the process and the development of cell tower infrastructure. Such
an alteration to the statute would create a potential node of democratic
engagement around the offer of funding and, if it were accepted, an
additional layer of oversight that might further debias and improve local
decisionmaking. As for RLUIPA, federal law could make a similar shift
and instead hold out an offer of funding to support land use development
that revolves around a local commitment not to impose substantial burdens
on religious exercise in the absence of compelling reasons. Or it could even
withhold other sources of federal money if localities make no such
commitment, though withholding funding for a distinct federal program
might raise concerns about unconstitutional coercion.196 Assuming that
those concerns were overcome, however, an incentive-based RLUIPA

193. Indeed, some have raised the concern that incentive nationalizations like the Clean Air Act
may be too effective, to the point of unconstitutional coercion. See Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial
Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 436–37 (2005).
194. Ryan, supra note 130, at 59.
195. See Coastal Zone Management Programs, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.
OFFICE FOR COASTAL MGMT., https://coast.noaa.gov/czm/mystate/. Illinois is the newest participant,
with its plan gaining approval in 2012. Id. Alaska had a plan but withdrew from the program in 2011.
Id.
196. See supra notes 126–127 and accompanying text. Either of these approaches might also
raise a variety of Establishment Clause concerns, but as noted above, see supra note 185 and
accompanying text, I bracket those concerns here. RLUIPA happens to be a land use statute that,
because of its subject matter, has potential Establishment Clause implications, but this discussion about
the implications of legislative design choices is distinct from the subject matter of particular statutes.
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would improve on the existing fiat RLUIPA by making local participation
in the scheme a matter of local democratic policymaking.
***
In terms of both the displacing-versus-channeling choice and the fiatversus-incentive choice, it is apparent that not all land use nationalization is
equally bad for local democracy. The following chart summarizes—even if
only somewhat crudely—the statutory designs that pose the greatest threat
to local democracy (indicated with an “X”) and those that are less
worrisome (indicated with a check mark).197
Displacing

Channeling

✕

✔

✔

✔

Fiat

Incentive

Contrary to the more bleak impression that pervades the discourse,
much land use nationalization of the channeling or incentive-based type
can actually advance local responsiveness by decreasing bias in
decisionmaking processes, creating spaces for bargaining and participation,
and making meaningful use of community knowledge. There is therefore
not only good reason not to fear these mechanisms, but good reason to
embrace them.
The responsiveness costs that ought to be a source of concern instead
come chiefly from a specific type of land use nationalization: displacing
fiat nationalization. It is plainly true that this category of nationalization
injects substantial structural bias into the operations of local land use
decisionmaking and reduces the impact of community knowledge. With
respect to this brand of national action, then, the literature is correct to
worry about the costs to local democracy.
197. In offering this depiction, I do not mean to suggest that these design choices are completely
binary or that the lines between these boxes are always crisp. For example, some channeling
mechanisms could leave localities more room to maneuver than others. To some degree, the latter may
operate more like displacing mechanisms. See infra notes 209–211 and accompanying text (making
same observation); supra note 141 (discussing Clean Air Act).

3 POLLACK - LAND USE - 707-758 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

Land Use Federalism’s False Choice

4/10/2017 1:24 PM

753

IV. WEIGHING LOCAL DEMOCRATIC COST
Having concluded that the threat to local democracy from land use
nationalization lies primarily with displacing restrictions imposed by fiat,
the next question is whether and when achieving a national land use goal in
that way—in other words, entering the box in the upper-left corner of the
chart depicted above—may be worth the costs.198 After all, while
advancing or protecting local democracy is crucially important for all of the
reasons discussed in Part I, it is not the only value at stake. The degree to
which the substance of the federal goal may be achieved—whether marketregulating or rights-protecting—is without a doubt relevant as well.
In light of the foregoing analysis, displacing fiat nationalization ought
to be employed—and these local democratic costs accordingly incurred—
only where alternative mechanisms will not effectively achieve the national
goal. In nearly all circumstances, displacing fiat nationalization may more
swiftly and assuredly fulfill the national land use goal, but it will do so at
great cost to important values shared by people and localities—and with
concrete consequences like disillusionment, backlash, and so on. The TCA,
CZMA, TEA-21, Housing Act, and others demonstrate that channeling
rules and incentive schemes hold out the promise of offering the same bang
for the federal government’s buck in terms of correcting the trajectory of a
locality’s land use decisionmaking. And they do so not only with fewer
collateral consequences, but with substantial positive spillover effects as
well.
Of course, it is impossible to offer a complete account of the
circumstances in which channeling and incentive mechanisms will
effectively achieve national goals. Knowing whether a particular goal can
be achieved at lower responsiveness costs will necessarily turn on evidence
offered in the context of specific problems Congress aims to solve. With its
attention properly focused on its full set of options, and with the costs of
each more completely understood, Congress should seek out precisely this
kind of information in hearings and as it considers land use legislation.
But even while recognizing the necessarily context-specific nature of
the question, it is possible to sketch a general understanding of the
categories of national action for which responsiveness costs may be
necessary evils that ought to be subordinated to national land use policy
goals. As a first cut, displacing fiat nationalization, costs and all, is more
likely to be appropriate with respect to rights-based nationalizations than

198. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in
Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1319–20 (1994) (observing that the values of
federalism and local democracy may clash with both market-regulating and rights-protecting efforts).
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with respect to market-regulating ones.199 This is the case because the
effective protection of rights, by its very nature, often requires the
imposition of at least some local democratic costs. After all, constitutional
rights are meant to be “trumps” that are not simply left to the whims of
democratic politics.200 To say that local democratic costs are sometimes
incurred in the course of protecting rights is essentially to describe what it
means for something to be a constitutional right: the protection and
enforcement of such rights may well mean limiting the choices (or reasons
for choices) available to democratic government. Similarly, the explicit and
direct enforcement of rights also has an expressive purpose. The federal
government can send a very powerful signal that a right is worthy of great
respect by demanding such respect—without any variation—through
displacing fiat nationalization.201 Sending such a signal can be considered
part of the national goal. Accordingly, even assuming that channeling or
incentives could equally achieve the concrete rights-protecting aim, such a
mechanism might sacrifice at least some of the messaging quality that
displacing fiat rights enforcement can offer.
By contrast, the interests at play with respect to land use statutes that
regulate markets are qualitatively distinct. Such policy aims are supposed
to be the result of the democratic process, and subject to the qualities and
commitments protected and expressed by rights. Whereas constitutional
rights can coherently be elevated above the local democratic process
without entirely betraying local democracy, the same cannot be said for
these kinds of policy priorities. Put another way, while imposing costs on

199. There are no doubt instances of market regulation in the land use context that might also be
motivated by the protection of constitutional rights like those guaranteed by the Takings Clause. While
these boundary cases might be closer calls, their roots in constitutional guarantees generally make them
more similar to rights-protecting nationalizations than to market-regulating nationalizations, for the
reasons discussed below.
200. I borrow here the Dworkinian language of rights as trumps. See RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKINGS RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977). In so doing, I do not mean to adopt the broadest, and most
criticized, conception that rights are trumps in the sense that they always overcome the collective will.
See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and
Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 729 (1998) (offering the critique that “governments can
infringe even the most fundamental rights if its justifications” satisfy strict scrutiny); Jeremy Waldron,
Pildes on Dworkin’s Theory of Rights, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 301, 306 n.22 (2000) (collecting sources).
Rather, because I simply mean to distinguish rights from policy preferences, it is sufficient here to
invoke the narrower view that rights are distinct from the kinds of interests that can be “balanced away
at the majority’s discretion” in the course of ordinary democratic politics. Linda McClain, Rights and
Irresponsibility, 43 DUKE L.J. 989, 1045 (1994) (discussing Dworkin’s theory). In other words,
constitutional rights have the potential to supersede the preferences of political majorities and to
therefore operate upon, rather than within, the democratic process. See Waldron, supra, at 302 (“[T]he
function of rights is to preclude governmental actions motivated by reasons that denigrate or express
contempt for certain members or sections of the community.”).
201. See Howard, supra note 48, at 22 (“The idea of justice connotes consistency in the law, the
notion that all citizens should enjoy the same rights.”); Waldron, supra note 200, at 305 (noting “the
partly expressive and symbolic character of rights”).
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local democracy in service of constitutional rights reflects the purpose of
constitutional rights, doing so in service of market regulation has no such
justification. Indeed, affording national regulatory policy aims the same
trump-like status as rights would have no limiting principle: there would be
no reason to permit any local variation or local participation at all.
More concretely, rights-protecting aims come with two significant
limitations on Congress’s ability to impose on localities. The first is that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s text provides that the set of rights that Congress
may vindicate is closed and limited to those set out in the Constitution.202
The second is that the Supreme Court has circumscribed Congress’s
authority to protect that closed set of rights by requiring that Congress’s
efforts be “congruen[t] and proportional[]” to “the injury to be prevented or
remedied.”203 As a result, accepting the imposition of the responsiveness
costs that come with displacing fiat nationalization in the context of the
protection of rights is to accept them with respect to an inherently narrow
range of possible action. This ensures that they will be incurred with
relative rarity.
If one were to accept those costs with respect to market-regulating
policy aims, by contrast, there would be little such limitation. The set of
aims Congress may pursue under its Commerce Clause power is
“expansive,” and the means available to Congress are not limited by any
sort of proportionality test.204 Moreover, the process of determining those
policy priorities is ill-suited to identifying the biases that are worth
correcting—or deploying as trumps—notwithstanding the costs for local
democracy because it is driven by interest groups acting within the political
system itself. It may be a process well suited to identifying biases that a
particular political coalition would like to alter, but that coalition cannot be
expected to account for the local democratic costs of its preferences. With
respect to rights, by contrast, the work of identifying the biases that may be
worth correcting even at great cost for local democracy has already been
done by the Constitution itself.
At most, then, the set of national land use goals for which the
responsiveness costs of displacing fiat nationalization might be acceptable
are more likely to be those on the rights-protecting side of the ledger.
Insofar as RLUIPA is designed to protect rights, it is therefore plausible
202. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
203. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
204. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012) (opinion of
Roberts, C.J.). While the Court’s fractured decision in NFIB stands for some limitation on Congress’s
Commerce Clause authority, no Justice disputed that “Congress has broad authority under the Clause,”
which embraces activities that have a “‘substantial effect’” on interstate commerce and even those that
do so only “when aggregated with similar activities of others.” Id. at 2585–86 (quoting United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 110, 119 (1941)); see id. at 2616 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part); id. at 2643 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
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that the fact that it is a displacing fiat nationalization with costs for local
democracy might be justified.205 Market regulation is qualitatively distinct,
however, and accepting the costs of displacing fiat nationalization for that
kind of policy goal lacks either the theoretical or doctrinal limitations that
attend rights-protecting legislation. A decision-displacing TCA would
therefore be very difficult to defend.
But just because a decision-displacing land use statute like RLUIPA
might be justified because it is meant to protect rights does not mean that
displacement is the only, or even optimal, mechanism by which to do so.
Indeed, not all rights-based land use nationalizations necessarily require
that degree of imposition on local democracy. As Part I.B discussed,
decisionmaking biases that might result in local rights violations exist in
two forms: conscious biases and, perhaps more innocent, structural
biases.206 The promise of channeling is quite compelling with respect to the
latter because structural biases result from incomplete information or
inadequately thoughtful deliberation. When rights are locally
underprotected as a result of this kind of systemic failure, reason-giving
requirements are likely to offer an adequate solution that harnesses and
improves, rather than overrides, local democracy.207 By contrast, when
rights are underprotected as a result of deeply entrenched, conscious biases
against a particular group, the promise of reason-giving and deliberation is
at its lowest ebb. After all, a decision maker knowingly committed to
harming or underserving a particular group may simply go through the
motions, or even lie about his or her reasons, when confronted with a
reason-giving obligation. If local democracy is so malicious, rather than
merely broken, then it may be necessary to put a stop to that malice by
imposing a displacing rule by fiat, notwithstanding the responsiveness
costs.208
Even in the case of conscious bias, however—the case in which siding
with rights over democracy is the strongest—Congress may still be able to
avoid the tradeoff. Though this Article’s discussion of legislative design
choice draws a sharp distinction between decision-displacement and
decision-channeling,209 there are a range of channeling mechanisms, and
some of them fall much closer to the displacing end of the spectrum. For
205. The same might be said about the FHA. See supra note 187.
206. See supra Part I.B.
207. See supra Part III.A.
208. See Komesar, A Job for the Judges, supra note 64, at 711–12 (discussing potential for
“counterbias” in such cases). Indeed, identifying the need for counterbias is already part of the thought
process required by the congruent-and-proportional test set out in City of Boerne’s interpretation of
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text. While that
test does not explicitly incorporate the consideration of local democratic cost, the proportionality
requirement is quite amenable to it.
209. See supra Part II.B.
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example, one-sided veto rights or supermajority voting requirements are
not entirely displacing because they do not dictate outcomes in particular
cases and instead “regulate only the manner of determining” outcomes,210
but neither are they as outcome-neutral as reason-giving requirements.
They can therefore tilt the scales much more substantially in favor of a
particular group while still leaving a role for local democracy that is more
robust than what displacing nationalizations permit. After all, giving a
particular group a veto still provides space for bargaining, logrolling, and
the rest of the democratic process to play out as others try to shape
decisions to avoid the veto, even as it puts that protected group in control.
The hypothetical Board of Religious Land Use Oversight I offered as a
replacement for RLUIPA is another example of a mechanism that is
channeling in nature but that is strongly tilted in favor of a particular
group.211 By employing these sorts of approaches, a Congress that wishes
to protect a particular right from conscious violation in the context of local
land use decisionmaking might be able to achieve its ends without resorting
to displacing fiat legislation.
In short, the set of circumstances in which the costs of displacing fiat
nationalization may be truly necessary evils in the context of land use
policy is small and limited to particularly stubborn, conscious biases that
result in rights violations at the local level. But even that case is not
immune from the broader lesson: Policy makers must recognize the full set
of mechanisms at their disposal and carefully consider the full range of
local democratic costs before they resort to a decision-displacing fiat
mechanism in service of a national land use goal.
CONCLUSION
The prospect of nationalization is often characterized as a threat to
local democracy and the important values it represents. But it is fair to say
that local control has a dark side too. Localities labor under substantial
pressures to prioritize parochial interests at the expense of regional and
national goals, and history is marked with shameful episodes of systematic
rights violations perpetrated by local governments. It is indeed a simple
statement of fact that the protection of constitutional rights and the orderly
functioning of nationwide markets may sometimes call for national
intervention. And particularly when local government is poisoned by
deeply entrenched and conscious biases against the exercise of
constitutional rights, the national government may be justified in displacing
local decisionmaking and imposing its own outcomes.
210. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004) (emphasis omitted).
211. See supra notes 181–187 and accompanying text.
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Short of such extreme circumstances, however, acting nationally need
not mean choosing national control over local control. This is a false
choice. Nationalization can take many forms, and nearly all of them impose
minimal costs on local democracy. Whether addressing market failures or
remedying rights violations that result from structural biases, decisionchanneling rules and incentive-based programs offer Congress the ability to
achieve its ends while preserving at the local level a real role for
community knowledge and meaningful opportunities for voice and access.
Indeed, these mechanisms can actually improve local democracy by
harnessing community knowledge, catalyzing participation, and debiasing
local government decisionmaking. Nationalization thus has the potential
both to achieve its goals and to generate positive spillovers for localities
and citizens’ relationships with them.
Policy makers and scholars therefore both ought to reassess Congress’s
efforts at nationalization. In the land use context, Congress deserves more
credit than it is often given for its frequent use of channeling and incentive
mechanisms. With respect to statutes like RLUIPA, however, Congress
ought to reconsider its foray into displacing local land use decisionmaking
and explore whether alternative mechanisms might better protect the values
of local control while offering equally effective protection of the rights at
issue. These insights need not stop at land use and zoning, either. From
environmental regulation to infrastructure development, and from
education policy to drug laws, more attention ought to be given to the
promise of channeling and of incentives to offer at once the best of
federalism and of nationalism.

